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465 
FISSURES IN THE VALLEY: SEARCHING FOR A 
REMEDY FOR U.S. TECH WORKERS 
INDIRECTLY DISPLACED BY H-1B VISA 
OUTSOURCING FIRMS 
INTRODUCTION 
“If I could just change one law,” lamented Bill Gates, “it would be this.”1 
What law provokes the ire of the Silicon Valley titan and co-chairman of 
the world’s largest philanthropic organization?2 Hint: it was at the center of 
a publicity maelstrom that struck the happiest place on earth—Walt Disney 
World3—as well as one of California’s largest power utilities, Southern 
California Edison (SCE).4 In 2015, reporters revealed that Disney and SCE 
laid off5 hundreds of their U.S. technology workers6 and replaced them with 
foreign visa workers supplied by outsourcing firms in an effort to cut IT 
                                                
1.  ZaZona, Bill Gates Dupes Students at Waterloo University, YOUTUBE (Feb. 28, 2008), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GB2OhaGLIp8.  
2.  See generally Karl Mathiesen, What is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation?, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/16/what-is-the-bill-
and-melinda-gates-foundation. Vivek Wadhwa, a former software entrepreneur turned-academic and H-
1B visa supporter, candidly explained that “Bill Gates’ interest as chairman of Microsoft are different 
than Bill Gates’ interest as a philanthropist.” Martin Kaste, Engineer Shortage? Duke Study Says No, 
NPR (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9910492. 
3.  In 2014, Disney laid off approximately 250 of its U.S. tech employees and required many of 
them to train their foreign replacements. See Patrick Thibodeau, Fury Rises at Disney Over Use of 
Foreign Workers, COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 29, 2015), https://perma.cc/M4F9-YY83; Julie Preston, 
Pink Slips at Disney. But First, Training Foreign Replacements., N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/us/last-task-after-layoff-at-disney-train-foreign-
replacements.html.  
4.  See Editorial, End H-1B Visa Program’s Abuse, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-visas-tech-workers-h1b-20150217-story.html; Patrick 
Thibodeau, Southern California Edison IT Workers ‘Beyond Furious’ Over H-1B Replacements, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 4, 2015), https://perma.cc/47CQ-6SSD (reporting SCE laid off 400 of its U.S. 
tech workers and required some to train their foreign replacements).  
5.  This Note uses the terms “lay off” and “displace” interchangeably to mean “to cause the 
worker’s loss of employment, other than through a discharge for inadequate performance, violation of 
workplace rules, cause, voluntary departure, voluntary retirement, or the expiration of a grant or 
contract.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(n)(4)(B), (D)(i)(I) (2012).  
6.  This Note uses the term “U.S. worker” according to its statutory definition: an employee 
who is either a U.S. citizen, U.S. national, permanent resident, alien lawfully admitted for temporary 
residence, refugee, or an alien granted asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(4)(E) (2012).  
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(information technology) labor costs.7 Rather than denying the allegations,8 
Disney and SCE argued that they had followed the letter of the law.9 
Unfortunately, the law is on their side. At issue was section 
101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),10 a law 
that facilitates the country’s most commonly utilized11 and most 
contentious, highly-skilled foreign worker program12—the H-1B visa.13 The 
majority of H-1B workers are young males born in India working in 
computer-related occupations—the industry that depends the most on 
foreign labor.14 
Layoffs such as those at Disney and SCE “had occurred numerous times 
over previous years, with little public comment.”15 Outsourcing firms, both 
in the U.S. and India, have a history of discriminating against American job 
applicants,16 exploiting H-1B visa holders,17 and commandeering 
                                                
7.  “Outsourcing” refers to a client organization enlisting a third-party to perform a function 
that the client would otherwise perform itself. See Karen E. Klein, Insource, Offshore, Outsource—
Help!, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 26, 2005), https://perma.cc/D5EE-KF6X; see also Tejas 
Shah & Michael A. Warner, Jr., Are Outsourcing Arrangements a New Vehicle for Alleging Employment 
Discrimination?, FRANCZEK RADELET P.C. (Jan. 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/D2MY-VYLX.  
8.  Disney characterized the layoffs as “restructuring [its] global technology organization to 
support future innovation and new capabilities.” Sandra Pedicini, Disney’s Technology Group 
Undergoing Restructuring, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.orlandosentinel 
.com/business/os-disney-technology-restructuring-20141028-story.html. SCE explained that it had 
adopted “a proven business strategy commonly . . . used by other top U.S. companies” in order to 
improve “capabilities while lowering costs.” Brian Watt, Southern California Edison Plans Layoffs and 
Outsourcing of Some Work, 89.3 KPCC (Apr. 16, 2014), https://perma.cc/J4FD-4PB5. 
9.  See Julia Preston, Judge Says Disney Didn’t Violate Visa Laws in Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/us/judge-says-disney-didnt-violate-visa-laws-in-
layoffs.html; Lisa Mascaro & Jim Puzzanghera, Senators Seek Federal Investigation of Alleged H-1B 
Visa Abuse at Edison, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/poli 
ticsnow/la-na-immigration-investigation-20150409-story.html. 
10.  INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (2012)).  
11.  Julia Funke, Supply and Demand: Immigration of the Highly-Skilled and Educated in the 
Post-9/11 Market, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 419, 427 (2015). 
12.  See Giovanni Peri et al., Foreign Scientists and Engineers and Economic Growth, 3 CATO 
PAPERS PUB. POL’Y 107, 114 (2014). 
13.  The H-1B nonimmigrant is defined as “an alien . . . who is coming temporarily to the United 
States to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation . . . or as a fashion model.” 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). Visa categories derive their name from the letter and numeral of their applicable 
subsection under the INA. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33977, IMMIGRATION 
OF FOREIGN WORKERS: LABOR MARKET TESTS AND PROTECTIONS 8 (Apr. 24, 2007).  
14.  See infra notes 298–301 and accompanying text. 
15.  See Matloff, supra note 9, at 88; see also RON HIRA, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE OFFSHORING 
OF INNOVATION 3 (Dec. 1, 2008), https://perma.cc/89XJ-8MBJ (“As recently as 1992 IBM never laid 
off an employee, but since 2002” it has forced “U.S. workers to train foreign replacements as a condition 
of severance and unemployment insurance.”). 
16.  See Stan Malos, Discrimination Cases Involving H-1B Immigration Status: An Updated 
Review and Analysis, 15 BENDER’S LAB. & EMP. BULL. 295, 299 (Sept. 2015) [hereinafter Malos, 
Updated] (noting Indian outsourcing firms Wipro, Infosys, and Tata have allegedly discriminated 
against U.S. job applicants in favor of Indian applicants).  
17.  See, e.g., India’s TCS pays $29.75 Million to Settle Class Action Suit, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 
2013), https://perma.cc/H5VN-XZBU (reporting Tata paid $29.75 million settlement after it was 
accused of forcing H-1B workers to sign over their tax refunds); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Teaneck, N.J., 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/8
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immigration law to maximize profits.18 Outsourcing firms sponsor visas for 
foreign workers, who are then contracted out to U.S. client companies. The 
clients in turn hand their U.S. tech employees the pink slip19 and oftentimes 
a Hobson’s choice: severance pay conditioned upon “‘knowledge transfer,’ 
an ugly euphemism for being forced to train their foreign replacements,”20 
or nothing.  
Political discourse and legal scholarship tends to view immigration in 
terms of undocumented aliens21 or those who are allowed entry via low-
skilled nonimmigrant worker visas (e.g., H-2A or H-2B visas).22 Virtually 
all previous scholarship on the H-1B program has been devoted to 
proposing reforms to its legislative labyrinth.23 But a lack of data has only 
                                                
Information Technology Company Agrees to Pay More than $509,000 in Back Wages Following U.S. 
Labor Department Investigation (Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.aila.org/infonet/dol-back-wages-h-1b-
violations-nj-it-company (announcing U.S. outsourcing firm Cognizant paid $509,607 to sixty-seven of 
its H-1B employees after DOL found the company had underpaid them). 
18.  In 2013, the Indian firm Infosys agreed to a record $34 million settlement amid accusations 
of “systemic visa fraud and abuse.” Tom Schoenberg et al., Infosys Settles with U.S. in Visa Fraud 
Probe, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 31, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-30/infosys-
settles-with-u-s-in-visa-fraud-probe. 
19.  Julia Preston, Disney Has No Comment on the Recent Reversal of Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 
23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/times-insider/2015/06/23/disney-has-no-comment-on-the-recent-
reversal-of-layoffs/ (reporting that Disney also told many Orlando businesses to not hire the laid off U.S. 
workers).  
20.  See Thibodeau, supra note 4; see also Stephanie Armour, Workers Asked to Train Foreign 
Replacements, USA TODAY (Apr. 6, 2004), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2004-
04-06-replace_x.htm. 
21.  See Peter Choi, Immigration as Business Strategy: Simplifying American Immigration Law 
in a Global Economy, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 164, 167 (2015) (noting the immigration debate “has often 
focused on substantive proposals—most commonly regarding legalization and border enforcement”). 
22.  This Note focuses on discrimination against highly-skilled U.S. workers, unlike most 
scholarship, which has generally been more concerned with the lower skilled H-2A (agricultural) or H-
2B (non-agricultural) visa workers. See, e.g., Rachel Bloomekatz, Rethinking Immigration Status 
Discrimination and Exploitation in the Low-Wage Workplace, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1963, 1965 (2007) 
(first article to analyze remedies for U.S. workers claiming their employer unfairly favored 
undocumented or low-skilled H-2A and H-2B workers); Bryce W. Ashby, Indentured Guests—How the 
H-2A and H-2B Temporary Guest Worker Programs Create the Conditions for Indentured Servitude 
and Why Upfront Reimbursement for Guest Workers’ Transportation, Visa, and Recruitment Costs is 
the Solution, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 893, 895 (2008) (arguing “de-facto indentured servitude” is common 
among H-2A and H-2B workers); Jennifer J. Lee, Private Civil Remedies: A Viable Tool for Guest 
Worker Empowerment, 46 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 31, 63, 67 (2012) (arguing low-skilled H-2A and H-2B 
workers should consider seeking relief under civil RICO, § 1981, and Title VII); Eleanor G. Carr, Search 
for a Round Peg: Seeking a Remedy for Recruitment Abuses in the U.S. Guest Worker Program, 43 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 399, 445 (2010) (discussing H-2 visa workers seeking relief via RICO, 
domestic tort claims, and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act). 
23.  See, e.g., Jung S. Hahm, American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 
1998: Balancing Economic and Labor Interests under the New H-1B Visa Program, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1673, 1699 (2000); Sabrina Underwood, Achieving the American Daydream: The Social, 
Economic, and Political Inequalities Experienced by Temporary Workers under the H-1B Visa Program, 
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fueled heated debates that have shed little light on the dollars-and-cents of 
the H-1B visa.24 This Note instead takes the distinct approach of analyzing 
potential remedies25 for U.S. tech workers who allege their U.S. employer 
replaced them in favor of H-1B workers supplied by outsourcing firms. Part 
I explains how the H-1B program’s protections—specifically, the labor 
condition application process (LCA) and its administrative remedies—have 
failed to hold employers accountable for discriminating against their U.S. 
tech employees.26 Part I concludes that the failures of the visa’s statutory 
regime necessitate a discussion of alternative remedies. 
Part II analyzes the viability of claims brought under federal statutes: 
namely, the civil provisions of the Racketeer and Influenced Corrupt 
Organization Act (civil RICO),27 the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986 (IRCA),28 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),29 
and section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (§ 1981).30 Part II 
concludes that among these alternatives, Title VII and § 1981 offer the most 
promise for displaced U.S. tech workers.  
                                                
15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 727, 746–47 (2001) (proposing reforms to end the exploitation of H-1B workers); 
Norman Matloff, On the Need for Reform of the H-1B Non-Immigrant Work Visa in Computer-Related 
Occupations, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 815, 901–12 (2003); Todd H. Goodsell, On the Continued Need 
for H-1B Reform: A Partial, Statutory Suggestion to Protect Foreign and U.S. Workers, 21 BYU J. PUB. 
L. 153, 156 (2007); Courtney L. Cromwell, Friend or Foe of the U.S. Labor Market: Why Congress 
Should Raise or Eliminate the H-1B Visa Cap, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 455, 458 (2009) 
(advocating for increasing the annual visa cap); Jessica F. Rosenbaum, Exploiting Dreams: H-1B Visa 
Fraud, its Effects, and Potential Solutions, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797, 813 (2011) (proposing a 
supplemental tax on H-1B employers in order to expand DOL oversight). 
24.  “It is no surprise that debate over whether domestic workers are sufficiently safeguarded 
from adverse effects of the H-1B visa program is as volatile as the statistics that justify the need for such 
a program.” Vincent C. Avagliano, The Second Wave: IT Outsourcing, Globalization, and Worker 
Rights, 23 PA. ST. INT’L L. REV. 663, 669 (2005). 
25.  See Christopher Fulmer, A Critical Look at the H-1B Visa Program and Its Effects on U.S. 
and Foreign Workers—A Controversial Program Unhinged From Its Original Intent, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 823, 841–43, 856-60 (2009) (proposing legislative reforms to the H-1B program, but 
also highlighting the administrative remedies for visa violations); Maria L. Ontiveros, H-1B Visas, 
Outsourcing and Body Shops: A Continuum of Exploitation for High Tech Workers, 38 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 41–42 (2016) (briefly discussing civil RICO and Title VII lawsuits brought by U.S. 
and H-1B workers); Malos, Updated, supra note 16 (analyzing ten H-1B discrimination cases); Stan 
Malos, Employment Discrimination Based on Immigration Status: Recent Cases Involving H-1B Visas, 
24 EMP. RESPS. & RTS. J. 23, 26 (2011) [hereinafter Malos, Employment Discrimination] (noting that 
“little if any scholarly research has addressed” H-1B discrimination case law). 
26.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-26, H-1B VISA PROGRAM: REFORMS ARE 
NEEDED TO MINIMIZE THE RISKS AND COSTS OF CURRENT PROGRAM 52 (2011) [hereinafter U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REFORMS ARE NEEDED] (explaining no “explicit provisions” cover U.S. client 
companies that acquire H-1Bs sponsored by outsourcing firms).  
27.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2012).  
28.  Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
29.  Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000–2000e-17 
(2012)).  
30.  42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/8
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However, it is still unclear whether these federal anti-discrimination 
statutes can effectively address H-1B discrimination. Part III concludes that 
tech workers will ultimately achieve the greatest job security through 
reforming the H-1B statutory scheme. But rather than recommend the 
content of those reforms, Part III proposes the catalyst—a sustained 
campaign of litigation, unionization, and education—all with the aim of 
exposing the corporate exploitation of American and foreign tech workers. 
I. THE H-1B VISA STATUTORY SCHEME AND ITS FAILURE TO ADDRESS 
THE FISSURED TECH WORKPLACE 
The tech industry’s demand for H-1B workers greatly exceeds the 
available supply,31 which is capped at 65,000 per year, albeit with plenty of 
exceptions.32 The visa cap—which Bill Gates has criticized as the “worst 
disaster”33—has been a lightning rod in the debate over the economic 
soundness of the H-1B program. Despite the visa’s important consequences 
on the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) labor 
market,34 especially computer-related jobs,35 surprisingly few studies have 
examined its effect on the employment opportunities of U.S. tech workers.36 
                                                
31.  See, e.g., Sari Pekkala Kerr, William R. Kerr, & William F. Lincoln, Firms and the 
Economics of Skilled Immigration, 15 INNOVATION POL’Y AND THE ECON. 115, 121 (2015) (noting that 
in 2014 and 2015 “demand exceeded the annual supply in the first week that the visas were available”); 
Danielle M. Drago, Losing the Best and the Brightest: The Disappearing Wage Premium for H-1B Visa 
Recipients, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1051, 1054 (2015) (“In the first six days of the 2015 application 
period, applicants filed almost three times as many applications as the number of available visas.”). 
32.  20,000 cap-exempt visas are allocated to nonimmigrants with master’s degrees or higher, as 
well as visas for employees of universities and certain research organizations. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(5)(A)–
(C) (2012).  
33.  Supra note 1.  
34.  Almost two-thirds of H-1B petitions are for STEM occupations. See NEIL G. RUIZ ET AL., 
THE SEARCH FOR SKILLS: DEMAND FOR H-1B IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS 1 
(Brookings Intuition 2012), https://perma.cc/A99U-FSCV. 
35.  See Payal Banerjee, Indian Information Technology Workers in the United States: The H-
1B Visa, Flexible Production, and the Racialization of Labor, 32 CRITICAL SOC. 425, 431 (2006) 
(estimating H-1B workers “comprise about one-sixth . . . of the total IT workforce in the [United 
States]”). 
36.  See supra note 31, at 130–42, for a discussion of current H-1B research. See also MADELINE 
ZAVODNY, IMMIGRATION AND AMERICAN JOBS, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INST. & PARTNERSHIP FOR A 
NEW AMERICAN ECON. 3 (2011), https://perma.cc/B6BU-CLSP (noting that while numerous studies 
have analyzed the effect of immigration on U.S. worker wages, there has been “relatively little research 
on” its effect on employment opportunities). 
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Thus, a vacuum of data37 and conflicting research methods38 have led to a 
cacophonic debate.39 Supporters argue the H-1B program attracts the “best 
and the brightest,”40 who fill a shortage in skilled domestic labor.41 Critics 
counter H-1Bs are “people of just ordinary talent, doing ordinary work”42 
for corporations that replace their older American IT staff with a younger, 
immobile,43 and thus cheaper, workforce.44  
Plenty of ink has been spilled on these issues. Part I will instead discuss 
the current H-1B statutory scheme and its administrative remedies 
ostensibly designed to protect U.S. workers. Part I argues that the program 
instead facilitates the legal displacement of U.S. tech workers, which is 
primarily due to the statutory scheme’s failure to address the realities of 
today’s fissured tech workplace.  
 
 
                                                
37.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REFORMS ARE NEEDED, supra note 26, at 30 
(explaining the “total number of H-1B workers” in the country is unknown “because of limitations in 
agency data”); William R. Kerr & William F. Lincoln, The Supply Side of Innovation: H-1B Visa 
Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention, 28 J. LAB. ECON. 473, 484 (2010) (noting the problem posed by 
“data limitations”). 
38.  See Sari Pekkala Kerr & William R. Kerr, Immigration and Employer Transitions for STEM 
Workers, 103 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 193, 193 (May 2013). 
39.  See NEIL G. RUIZ ET AL., supra note 34, at 31–32 n.15 (arguments in support of the program); 
id. at 32–33 n.18 (criticisms of the program). See also Ron Hira, Brookings H-1B Report’s Flawed 
Analysis & Flawed Process, ECON. POL’Y INST. WORKING ECON. BLOG (May 13, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/F49H-L38B. 
40.  See, e.g., Drago, supra note 31; Jennifer Hunt & Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle, How Much 
Does Immigration Boost Innovation?, 2 AM. ECON. J. MACROECON. 31, 33 (2010) (estimating 
“immigrants account for 24 percent of patents, twice their share in the population”). 
41.  Compare Strengthening American Competiveness for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 110th Cong. 9 (2007) (statement of Bill Gates, 
Chairman, Microsoft Corp.) (“[W]e face a critical shortage of scientific talent, and there’s only one way 
to solve that crisis today. Open our doors to highly talented scientists and engineers . . . .”), with WILLIAM 
P. BUTZ, ET AL., RAND, IS THERE A SHORTAGE OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS? HOW WOULD WE 
KNOW? 4 (2003), https://perma.cc/8YGU-EN2E (“[N]either earnings patterns nor unemployment 
patterns indicate [a] . . . shortage in the data we are able to find.”).  
42.  See, e.g., NORMAN MATLOFF, H-1BS: STILL NOT THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST, CENT. FOR 
IMMIGR. STUD. 1, 4 (MAY 2008), https://perma.cc/3CJE-39N4 (calculating seventy percent of H-1Bs are 
concentrated at DOL skill Levels I and II, which are for “apprentice-like positions with only ‘limited 
exercise of judgment’”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REFORMS ARE NEEDED, supra 
note 26, at 58 (estimating fifty-four percent of H-1B workers were Level I “and were paid at the lowest 
pay grades allowed under the prevailing wage levels”); Ron Hira, New Data Show How Firms Like 
Infosys and Tata Abuse the H-1B Program, ECON. POL’Y INST. BLOG (Feb. 19, 2015, 10:47 AM), 
https://perma.cc/7FS6-D55K (arguing that if U.S. workers are training their foreign replacements, then 
it is obvious that the U.S. workers are better qualified). 
43.  See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1285, 1298 (2012) (arguing H-1Bs face “serious restrictions on job mobility” because the visa’s validity 
is largely contingent on the worker remaining with the same employer).  
44.  See Norman Matloff, Immigration and the Tech Industry: As a Labour Shortage Remedy, 
for Innovation, or for Cost Savings?, 10 MIGRATION LETTERS No. 2, 210, at 219–24 (2013), 
https://perma.cc/J8AV-PALF.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/8
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A. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA): A Decentralized 
Approach to Skilled Foreign Labor  
Congress has the explicit authority to regulate immigration.45 But 
contrary to popular opinion, the “federal government rarely makes decisions 
on its own about which immigrants should be admitted.”46 Instead, under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)47—the foundation of all 
U.S. immigration law48—Congress delegates substantial immigration 
authority to non-governmental agents (i.e., private employers).49 Employers 
are granted the greatest control over foreign workers who qualify as 
nonimmigrants (i.e., temporary), as opposed to immigrants (i.e., 
permanent).50 Compared to global standards,51 the American approach to 
skilled nonimmigrant visa workers is atypical because the H-1B program 
“is built around written requests from [employers] for access to specific 
workers.”52 The petitioning employer initiates the visa process and 
maintains considerable control over the foreign worker.53  
The INA first “opened the door for the entry of high-skill, temporary 
workers”54 with its creation of the H-1 visa category for nonimmigrant 
workers55—the precursor to the H-1B.56 The original H-1 nonimmigrants 
were required to maintain “a residence in a foreign country which [they had] 
                                                
45.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power “[t]o establish an uniform Rule 
of Naturalization”).  
46.  Cox & Posner, supra note 43, at 1287. 
47.  Pub. L. No. 82–414, 66 Stat. 1638 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
48.  See Richard A. Posthuma et al., Hiring Foreign Workers: Developments in Immigration and 
Discrimination Laws, 3 J. EMP. DISCRIMINATION L. 49, 52 (Winter 2001). 
49.  Cox & Posner, supra note 43, at 1287.  
50.  Id. at 1287.  
51.  “Canadian-style centralized systems of migrant screening are popular outside the United 
States.” Cox & Posner, supra note 43, at 1349. 
52.  Kirk Doran, Alexander Gelber, & Adam Isen, The Effects of High-Skilled Immigration 
Policy on Firms: Evidence from Visa Lotteries 1 (Rev. Version of Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 20668, 2016), https://perma.cc/29RR-PP78. 
53.  See Rosenbaum, supra note 23, at 814 (criticizing employers’ wide discretion over their H-
1B employees). 
54.  Margaret L. Usdansky & Thomas J. Espenshade, The H-1B Visa Debate in Historical 
Perspective: The Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Foreign-Born Workers 6 (U.C. San Diego Ctr. for 
Comp. Immigr. Stud., Working Paper No. 11, 2000), https://perma.cc/92LU-JNPH. 
55.  The H-nonimmigrant category is the INA’s main category of temporary workers. See 
DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, BALANCING INTERESTS: RETHINKING U.S. 
SELECTION OF SKILLED WORKERS 81 (1996).  
56.  See SAMUEL ESTREICHER, CROSS-BORDER HUMAN RESOURCES, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 
ISSUES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 54TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 139 
(Andrew P. Morriss & Samuel Estreicher eds., 2005). 
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no intention of abandoning,” be “of distinguished merit and ability,” and 
intend to come to the country temporarily to perform services “of an 
exceptional nature requiring such merit and ability.”57 In short, the H-1 visa 
reflected many of the federal policies of the 1950s and 1960s that sought to 
grow the economy while also protecting U.S. labor interests.58  
B. Immigration Act of 1990: A Contradictory Approach to Skilled Foreign 
Labor 
However, by 1990, labor organizations criticized that the H-1 visa “no 
longer reflected its original intent.”59 Concerned that employers were 
misusing the H-1 program to fill entry-level positions,60 labor organizers 
recommended that Congress separate foreign business professionals from 
nurses, entertainers, and athletes.61 However, the business community and 
immigration bar sought to prevent the imposition of any onerous labor 
certification process.62 
Congress sought to placate these competing concerns in the Immigration 
Act of 1990,63 which added new categories of nonimmigrant visas. Among 
these was the H-1B visa,64 which eliminated the original H-1 “distinguished 
                                                
57.  Pub. L. No. 82–414, § 101(15)(H), 66 Stat. 163, 168. 
58.  See PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 55, at 18–19.  
59.  H. Rosemary Jeronimides, The H-1B Visa Category: A Tug of War, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
367, 371 (1993) (noting that prior to the 1990 Act, it was possible to qualify for an H-1 visa “with no 
college degree and just a few years of work experience.”). Part of the problem was INS’s interpretation 
of “distinguished” to mean any individual deemed a “professional”—which in turn required a bachelor’s 
degree as a prerequisite to work in the occupation. See Matter of Essex Cryogenics Indus., Inc., 14 I. & 
N. Dec. 196, 197 (BIA 1972) (accepting INS’s interpretation); Constantine S. Potamianos, The 
Temporary Admission of Skilled Workers to the United States under the H-1B Program: Economic Boon 
or Domestic Work Force Scourge?, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 789, 796 (1997). 
60.  See B. Lindsay Lowell, H-1B Temporary Workers: Estimating the Population, at 4–5 (U.C. 
San Diego: Ctr. for Comparative Immigr. Stud., Working Paper No. 12, 2000). 
61.  See Jeronimides, supra note 59, at 371 (noting that in 1987, forty-eight percent of all H-1 
visas were issued to entertainers). In addition, organized labor was concerned with the lack of a visa cap 
and any requirement that employers first exhaust the domestic labor market before hiring foreign 
workers. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/PEMD-92-17, IMMIGRATION AND THE LABOR MARKET: 
NONIMMIGRANT ALIEN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (1992).  
62.  See Jeronimides, supra note 59, at 372 (noting U.S. employers wanted to abolish the 
requirement that H-1 visa workers maintain an overseas domicile in order to overcome the presumption 
of their intent to permanently settle in the U.S.); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) (2012) (presuming “every 
alien,” except for certain nonimmigrants such as H-1Bs, to be an “immigrant”).  
63.  Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
64.  While the H-1B visa was technically created prior to the 1990 Act with the passage of the 
Immigration Nursing Relief Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-238, 103 Stat. 2099 (1989) (amending 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C), it was under the 1990 Act that the H-1B visa took its current form. See, 
e.g., Jeronimides, supra note 59, at 369 n.9. 
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merit and ability” standard.65 Instead, H-1B nonimmigrants were required 
to work in a “specialty occupation,” defined as a job that requires “(A) 
theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized 
knowledge, and (B) attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in the 
specific specialty . . . .”66  
The H-1B visa reflected Congress’s scizophrenic approach to 
immigration. On the one hand, Congress satisfied business interests by 
rejecting “any recruitment obligations, positive tests of the labor market, 
and other obligations for employers to demonstrate U.S. worker 
unavailability”67—unlike other H-category nonimmigrants68 and contrary to 
popular opinion.69 In addition, Congress allowed H-1B nonimmigrants to 
have dual intent, meaning they could intend to stay in the country 
temporarily or plan to permanently settle in the future.70 On the other hand, 
Congress ostensibly sought to protect U.S. workers by imposing an annual 
cap of 65,000 visas and requiring prospective H-1B employers undergo a 
labor condition application (LCA) process.71  
C. The LCA Requirements and the H-1B Visa Program’s Administrative 
Remedies: An Inadequate Protection for U.S. Tech Workers  
An employer seeking to employ H-1B nonimmigrants must first file an 
LCA, which requires the employer make four attestations subject to 
                                                
65.  Inexplicably, H-1B visas also cover fashion models of “distinguished merit and ability.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). Nevertheless, the majority of H-1B visas are issued to specialty workers 
in high-tech industries. See Malos, Employment Discrimination, supra note 25, at 25.  
66.  8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) (defining “specialty occupation”).  
67.  Angelo A. Paparelli & Mona D. Patel, The Immigration Act of 1990: Death Knell for the H-
1B?, 25 INT’L LAW 995, 997 (Winter 1991). 
68.  For example, employers that petition the government to sponsor H-2A (agricultural) or H-
2B (non-agricultural) visa workers must attest (1) “there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, 
. . . qualified,” and available, and (2) hiring the foreign worker “will not adversely affect the wages and 
working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1) (2012) 
(H-2A) (emphasis added); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(i)(A) (2016) (H-2B).  
69.  See, e.g., Fulmer, supra note 25, at 828 n.28 (noting a Wall Street Journal article erroneously 
stating that all employers must “attest that [they] can’t find a U.S. worker” before hiring an H-1B). 
70.  See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/HEHS-00-157, H-1B FOREIGN WORKERS: BETTER 
CONTROLS NEEDED TO HELP EMPLOYERS AND PROTECT WORKERS 6 (2000). 
71.  See, e.g., Implementation of the Immigration Act of 1990: Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Int’l Law, Immigr., and Refugees of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 96 (May 15, 1991) 
(statement of David O. Williams, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training, Department 
of Labor) (“[A]ttestations are required to assure the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers are 
not adversely affected.”); Potamianos, supra note 59, at 797–98 (explaining the dual concerns that 
shaped the H-1B visa). 
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perjury.72 First, the employer must verify that it will pay the H-1B employee 
the required wage rate.73 Second, and most importantly, the employer must 
agree that it “will provide working conditions for [the H-1B worker] that 
will not adversely affect the working conditions of workers similarly 
employed.”74 Third, the employer confirms that there is no “strike, lockout, 
or work stoppage . . . in the occupational classification in the area of 
intended employment.”75 Lastly, the employer attests that it “provided 
notice of the filing of the [LCA] to the bargaining representative of the 
employer’s employees in the occupational classification in which the H-1B 
nonimmigrants will be employed . . . or, if there is no such bargaining 
representative, has posted notice . . . in conspicuous locations . . . .”76 Under 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(A), Congress tasked the Department of Labor (DOL) 
with investigating worker complaints of LCA violations and enforcing 
administrative remedies against noncompliant employers.77 
On its face, the LCA reaffirms the “overriding principle . . . that foreign 
workers should not be able to compete with U.S. workers on the basis of the 
price for their labor.”78 Yet DOL’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) has 
consistently criticized the LCA as doing “little to protect the jobs or wage 
levels of U.S. workers.”79 As discussed below, the statutory scheme’s 
failure to prevent the displacement of U.S. workers is primarily for three 
reasons: first, the LCA is administered by a complex bureaucracy that has 
limited oversight and enforcement authority; second, Congress crafted a 
prolix statutory scheme riddled with LCA exceptions that benefit 
outsourcing firms and their U.S. clients; and third, these companies exploit 
                                                
72.  See 20 C.F.R. § 655.700(b) (2016); see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ETA FORM 9035 & 
9035E, LABOR CONDITION APPLICATION FOR NONIMMIGRANT WORKERS, 
https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/ETA_Form_9035.pdf [hereinafter LCA]. 
73.  See 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(d)(1) (2016). An employer must attest that it will pay H-1B 
employees “at least the local prevailing wage or the employer’s actual wage, whichever is higher, and 
pay for nonproductive time.” LCA, supra note 72, at 4.  
74.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n) (2012) (emphasis added). Cf. 20 C.F.R. § 655.732(a) (2016) (explaining 
the second LCA requirement is met when the employer affords the same “working conditions to its H-
1B . . . employees . . . as it affords to its U.S. worker employees who are similarly employed, and without 
adverse effect upon the working conditions of such U.S. worker employees.”) (emphasis added).  
75.  20 C.F.R. § 655.733(a) (2016). 
76.  20 C.F.R. § 655.734 (2016). Following ETA’s approval of the LCA, the employer submits 
a Form I-129 (H-1B petition) to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS). See 20 C.F.R. § 655.700(b)(2) (2016). 
77.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(A) (2016) (directing the Secretary of Labor to “establish a process 
for the receipt, investigation, and disposition of complaints respecting a petitioner’s failure to meet a 
condition specified in an application . . . or a petitioner’s misrepresentation of material facts in such an 
application.”). 
78.  PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 55, at 72 (emphasis omitted). 
79.  U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR’S FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION 
PROGRAMS: THE SYSTEM IS BROKEN AND NEEDS TO BE FIXED 3 (1996) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, THE SYSTEM IS BROKEN]. See 76 U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. SEMIANN. REP. TO CONGRESS (Apr. 1–
Sept. 30, 2016) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, SEMIANNUAL REPORT] (reiterating DOL’s oversight 
authority has “been an ongoing concern . . . since the mid-1990s”). 
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a gap in statutory and regulatory authority in order to evade the requirement 
that H-1B petitioners maintain an employer-employee relationship with 
their H-1B employees.  
1. The Department of Labor’s Inadequate Oversight and Enforcement 
Authority 
A hodgepodge of four federal departments and their respective divisions 
are tasked with overseeing the H-1B program.80 This division of 
responsibilities impedes the sharing of information that would otherwise 
allow meaningful investigation of employer abuses.81 More problematic is 
DOL’s limited oversight and enforcement authority. According to the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), DOL’s review of the LCA “is 
not intended to identify . . . lack of [employer] compliance with the 
attestations made on the LCA.”82 Instead, the law explicitly provides that 
“[l]abor shall review [the LCA] only for completeness and obvious 
inaccuracies.”83 In other words, DOL’s certification of the LCA is little 
more than a rubber stamp.84 
DOL’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) is responsible for investigating 
complaints of LCA violations,85 imposing civil money penalties,86 and on 
                                                
80.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REFORMS ARE NEEDED, supra note 26, at 44–45 
(listing the agencies, their roles, and limitations). DOL’s Employment and Training Administration 
(ETA) reviews the LCA, and its Wage and Hour Division (WHD) investigates complaints concerning 
the LCA requirements concerning wage and working conditions. Id. The Department of Homeland 
Security’s United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is tasked with reviewing H-1B 
petitions, and its Directorate of Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) conducts site visits to 
verify the accuracy of the LCA and H-1B petitions. Id. Finally, the State Department interviews the 
foreign worker and issues the visa. See Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.705 (2016) (detailing the agencies’ 
responsibilities). 
81.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REFORMS ARE NEEDED, supra note 26, at 44–46. 
82.  Id. at 46. DOL is unable verify whether a nonimmigrant is qualified for the position because 
when employers file the LCA, they are requesting DOL’s “approval for one or more positions, not 
specific aliens.” U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITIES IN THE 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR’S ALIEN CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS 10 (2003) (emphasis added). 
83.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(G) (2012). 
84.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 82, at 1 (“The H-1B is a ‘rubber stamp’ program 
. . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, SEMIANNUAL REPORT, supra note 79, at 5 (“Given this fact, it is not 
surprising that . . . the H-1B program [is] susceptible to significant fraud and abuse, particularly by 
dishonest immigration attorneys, labor brokers, employers, and organized criminal enterprises.”). 
85.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(A) (2012).  
86.  Civil monetary fines range from $1811, $7370, or $51,588 per violation. See 20 C.F.R. § 
655.810 (2017) (explaining the various remedies and the applicable factors in assessing the penalty). In 
addition, WHD may impose other remedies, including the reinstatement of workers who suffered 
retaliation for participating in an investigation, reinstatement of displaced U.S. workers, and back wages. 
Id.  
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rare occasions, referring employers to the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) for “debarment” (disqualification from the H-1B 
program).87 But this complaint-driven enforcement scheme88 is 
underutilized by workers, especially H-1B workers, who are often reluctant 
to complain out of fear of retaliation and deportation.89  
Furthermore, DOL can only initiate investigations in four situations.90 
Even in these limited circumstances, employer cooperation is unlikely 
because the fine “for not cooperating is far less than the potential penalty” 
for violating the LCA.91 DOL officials are essentially caught in a catch-22. 
On the one hand, DOL has been criticized in the past for lax enforcement.92 
On the other hand, DOL has little authority to conduct thorough 
investigations.  
For example, in Greater Missouri Medical Pro-Care Providers, Inc. v. 
Perez, the Eighth Circuit held that DOL officials erred in expanding the 
scope of an employer investigation based on an “aggrieved party” complaint 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(A).93 In Perez, an H-1B worker alleged her 
employer committed the following abuses: forced her to pay all of the visa 
filing fees, including attorney’s fees; required her and other H-1B workers 
to stay in a company-paid apartment during the time she studied for a 
licensing exam; during this non-productive time the employer only paid the 
workers $50 per week for food; and her contract included an illegal early 
                                                
87.  See Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Camo Techs., Inc., Arb. No. 11-026, ALJ 
No. 2010-LCA-23, at 3 (DOL Adm. Rev. Bd. Aug. 31, 2012). 
88.  Under the H-1B statutory scheme, “any aggrieved party” may file complaints to redress 
violations of the LCA attestations. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.715 (2016) (defining “aggrieved party”); see 
also 20 C.F.R. § 655.806 (2016) (detailing the complaint filing process).  
89.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REFORMS ARE NEEDED, supra note 26, at 45, 59. 
The majority of complaints are filed by H-1B workers, but the overall number remains small. Id. at 47. 
90.  DOL’s WHD can only initiate H-1B-related investigations as a result of one of four factors: 
(1) an “aggrieved party” files a complaint, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(A); (2) DOL receives “credible 
information from a knowledgeable source (other than an aggrieved party) that an employer willfully” 
violated the LCA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(G)(ii); (3) DOL randomly investigates “employers who (within 
the last five years) were found . . . to be willful violators,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(F); or (4) “the Secretary 
of Labor personally certifies that there is reasonable cause to believe” there was a violation, 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(n)(2)(G)(i). See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REFORMS ARE NEEDED, supra note 26, at 47 
n.74; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2) (2012). An “aggrieved party” includes a U.S. or H-1B worker 
“whose job, wages, or working conditions are adversely affected by the employer’s alleged non-
compliance with the [LCA].” 20 C.F.R. § 655.715 (2016). 
91.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REFORMS ARE NEEDED, supra note 26, at 49. 
92.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-720, H-1B VISA PROGRAM: LABOR COULD 
IMPROVE ITS OVERSIGHT AND INCREASE INFORMATION SHARING WITH HOMELAND SECURITY 3 (2006) 
(noting DOL’s review of LCAs is “timely, but lacks quality assurance controls and may overlook some 
inaccuracies.”). 
93.  See Greater Mo. Med. Pro-Care Providers, Inc. v. Perez, 812 F.3d 1132, 1139 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that while DOL has the authority to investigate a single allegation in an aggrieved party 
complaint, DOL cannot “authorize the comprehensive initial investigation of the employer and its 
general compliance”). 
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termination fee.94 DOL treated the complaint as an “aggrieved party 
complaint” and determined it had “reasonable cause” to conduct a thorough 
investigation in order to determine whether there were “violations to any 
employee.”95 As a result of the comprehensive investigation, DOL ordered 
the employer pay $382,889.87 to forty-five H-1B workers.96 On appeal, the 
Eighth Circuit vacated the award and rejected DOL’s argument that 
“reasonable cause to investigate any single violation alleged by an 
aggrieved party” establishes a reasonable cause to investigate the 
employer’s general H-1B compliance with respect to all of its employees.97 
But DOL’s limited oversight authority is not the only problem for 
workers seeking relief for LCA violations. There is also a procedural issue.98 
Workers lack the right to bring a private cause of action in court for LCA 
violations.99 Instead, they must traverse a complicated administrative 
process that can drag on for many years.100 Of course, this assumes that the 
worker filed the complaint with the correct agency. Depending on the 
particular LCA violation alleged, this could either be DOL’s WHD101 or the 
                                                
94.  Id. at 1134. 
95.  Id. at 1138 (emphasis added). 
96.  Id. at 1135. 
97.  Id. at 1137–39. However, DHS began proactively inspecting worksites after a 2008 audit of 
visa petitions revealed twenty-one percent were either fraudulently filed or contained technical 
violations. See generally U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., H-1B BENEFIT FRAUD AND COMPLIANCE 
ASSESSMENT (Sept. 2008) (finding thirteen percent of petitions audited were fraudulent and seven 
percent had technical violations); Foley & Lardner LLP, H-1B Compliance: The FDNS Site Visit, 
LEXOLOGY (Aug. 30, 2010), https://perma.cc/FNG5-KQ9G (noting that from October 2009 to August 
2010, DHS conducted over 14,000 H-1B worksite visits). 
98.  Ontiveros, supra note 25, at 28. 
99.  See Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 422 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding implied cause 
of action did not exist for a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n) where an American software engineer of 
East Indian origin alleged his employer hired H-1B nonimmigrants by falsely representing that there 
was shortage of qualified U.S. software engineers); Biran v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 2002 WL 
31040345, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing a U.S. tech worker’s complaint for failure to exhaust his 
administrative remedies under 8 U.S.C. §1182(n) and 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b) “because no private right of 
action exists to enforce those statutory provisions”); Watson v. United States, 2007 WL 5171595, at *1 
(Fed. Cl. 2007). 
100.  See Brian Green et al., Immigration Action: The Civil Litigation Side of Employing Foreign 
Nationals, 30 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 205, 215–17 (2015) (helpful overview of the process for filing 
complaints with DOL). See also Shah v. Wilco Sys., Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 641, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
101.  DOL’s WHD is responsible for investigating almost all complaints regarding LCA 
violations. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.805 (2016) (listing the violations WHD may investigate). The following 
process applies to such complaints. First, an aggrieved worker must file the complaint with DOL’s 
WHD, who will determine whether there exists reasonable cause to believe that the violation occurred. 
20 C.F.R. § 655.806(a)(2) (2016). If WHD determines such reasonable cause exists, it will investigate 
and issue its findings in a determination letter. 20 C.F.R. § 655.806(a)(3). If the worker or employer 
disagrees with WHD’s findings, either party may appeal by requesting a hearing before an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who is required to issue a decision. 20 C.F.R. § 655.820. The ALJ’s 
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Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Immigrant and Employee Rights Section 
(IER),102 which until recently was the Office of Special Counsel for 
Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices.103 Oftentimes, workers 
seek relief without legal representation.104 Given the visa regime’s 
administrative technicalities, it comes as no surprise that pro se litigants 
have had little success.105  
2. How LCA Exemptions and Fissured Work Facilitate the Indirect 
Displacement of U.S. Tech Workers  
In 2008, DHS concluded that the H-1B program was rife with 
“significant” fraud.106 Nevertheless, fraudulent LCAs do not explain the H-
1B statutory scheme’s failure to prevent the displacement of U.S. tech 
workers. Instead, the visa statutory scheme facilitates the legal displacement 
of U.S. tech workers because of exemptions that favor the outsourcing 
model.  
The H-1B program defines two types of displacement: (1) direct (or 
primary) and (2) indirect (or secondary).107 Direct displacement occurs 
when a petitioning H-1B employer lays off one of its own U.S. employees 
within a certain time period and fills that position with an H-1B 
nonimmigrant sponsored by the employer.108 Indirect displacement occurs 
when a petitioner, such as an outsourcing firm, contracts its H-1B 
                                                
decision may then be reviewed by DOL’s Administrative Review Board (ARB). 20 C.F.R. § 655.845(a). 
Only at the end of this process may parties file an appeal in the appropriate U.S. District Court. 20 C.F.R. 
§ 655.850. 
102.  DOJ’s IER handles complaints filed under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(5) regarding an “H-1B 
dependent” employer’s or “willful violator” employer’s failure to offer the job to a U.S. applicant who 
is equally or better qualified than the H-1B nonimmigrant sought for the job. 20 C.F.R. § 655.705(a) 
(2016). See infra note 119. Filing complaints with DOJ involve a different process than those filed with 
DOL. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(n)(5)(B)–(F) (requiring arbitration proceedings). 
103.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Cautions Employers Seeking H-1B 
Visas Not to Discriminate Against U.S. Workers (Apr. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/62H8-ULBL. USCIS 
recently made the complaint process easier by establishing an email address that allows workers who 
suspect fraud or abuse to submit tips and alleged violations. Press Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. 
Servs., Putting American Workers First: USCIS Announces Further Measures to Detect H-1B Visa 
Fraud and Abuse (Apr. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/H3M8-F4DR. 
104.  See Malos, Updated, supra note 16, at 296 (“[E]mployer successes in defending these claims 
. . . should be interpreted with caution in that many were filed by pro se plaintiffs who . . . failed to 
exhaust administrative remedies, failed to file with the proper tribunal, or failed to do so in a timely 
manner.”). 
105.  See Takamiya v. DNP Am., LLC, 2016 WL 4030861, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (dismissing 
pro se H-1B worker’s complaint as untimely where she filed more than twelve months after the alleged 
LCA violation).  
106.  U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 97, at 15. 
107.  Fulmer, supra note 25, at 853. 
108.  See 20 C.F.R. § 655.738(c) (2016) (defining direct displacement). The direct displacement 
prohibition applies within a period beginning ninety days before and ending ninety days after the filing 
date of an H-1B petition supported by the LCA. Id. 
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employees to a secondary employer, usually a U.S. client company, thereby 
enabling the U.S. client to replace its U.S. employees with the outsourcing 
firm’s H-1B workers.109  
The H-1B statutory scheme did not explicitly address displacement until 
1997, the first year that the visa cap was met110 and the start of the tech 
industry’s lobbying efforts.111 An influx of high-tech money and unreliable 
studies112 ultimately led to the passage of the American Competitiveness 
and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (the “1998 Act”).113 Like the 1990 
Act, the 1998 Act introduced half-hearted measures that were ostensibly 
designed to protect U.S. labor.114 Specifically, the 1998 Act imposed 
additional LCA attestations on petitioners that either qualify as “willful 
violators”115 or “H-1B dependent.”116 All major outsourcing firms are H-1B 
dependent.117  
In addition to the four LCA attestations that apply to all petitioners, the 
1998 Act required that H-1B dependent employers sign two additional 
attestations, most important of which is the non-displacement 
requirement.118 It has two components. First, an H-1B dependent employer 
                                                
109.  See 20 C.F.R. § 655.738(d) (2016) (defining secondary displacement).  
110.  Usdansky & Espenshade, supra note 54, at 10. 
111.  See Matloff, supra note 23, at 816. 
112.  See Matloff, supra note 23, at 822–23 (noting GAO criticized one report as suffering from 
“serious analytical and methodological weaknesses”). 
113.  See, e.g., Susan Martin, B. Lindsay Lowell, & Philip Martin, U.S. Immigration Policy: 
Admission of High Skilled Workers, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 619, 629 (2002) (noting Congress temporarily 
raised the visa cap in 1998 and 2000 “[p]rimarily as the result of lobbying by the information technology 
industry”). 
114.  See Matloff, supra note 23, at 825; see also RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL 33977, IMMIGRATION OF FOREIGN WORKERS: LABOR MARKET TESTS AND PROTECTIONS 20 (Apr. 
24, 2007). 
115.  See 20 C.F.R. § 655.736(f) (2017) (defining “willful violator” employer). 
116.  An employer is H-1B dependent if it: (1) has twenty-five or fewer full-time equivalent (FTE) 
employees in the United States, of which eight or more are H-1Bs; (2) has twenty-six to fifty FTE 
employees in the United States, of which thirteen or more are H-1Bs; or (3) has fifty-one or more FTE 
employees, of which more than fifteen percent are H-1Bs. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(3)(A) (2012); see also 
20 C.F.R. § 655.736(a) (2016). The fifteen percent threshold applies to all employees regardless of 
occupation; so even if fifty percent of an employer’s IT staff are H-1Bs, it would still be unlikely that 
the employer would qualify as H-1B dependent because “most employers would have enough non-
technical workers” (e.g., management, administrative staff, and janitors). Matloff, supra note 23, at 825.  
117.  See, e.g., Letter from M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to Richard 
J. Durbin, U.S. Senator (Apr. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/AX5W-MVRU (“Typically, consulting 
companies that contract with U.S. firms to supply H-1B IT workers are dependent employers.”); Patrick 
Thibodeau, H-1B Loophole May Help California Utility Offshore IT Jobs, COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 17, 
2004), https://perma.cc/3ZW6-S4KM (“All the major offshore firms, . . . are H-1B dependent.”).  
118.  In addition to the non-displacement requirement, and outside the scope of this Note, is the 
requirement that H-1B dependent employers recruit U.S. workers in good-faith before hiring H-1B 
workers. Moreover, an H-1B dependent employer must attest on the LCA that it offered the job to any 
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must agree that it has not directly displaced and will not directly displace its 
U.S. employees within a 180-day period.119 Second, an H-1B dependent 
employer must attest that that it will not indirectly displace a client’s U.S. 
employees. Specifically, the controlling statute provides that the H-1B 
dependent employer— 
will not place the nonimmigrant with another employer (regardless 
of whether or not such other employer is an H-1B-dependent 
employer) where—  
(i) the nonimmigrant performs duties in whole or in part at one or 
more worksites owned, operated, or controlled by such other 
employer; and  
(ii) there are indicia of an employment relationship between the 
nonimmigrant and such other employer.120 
  
However, this non-displacement provision does not apply if the H-1B 
dependent employer— 
has inquired of the other employer as to whether, and has no 
knowledge that, within the period beginning 90 days before and 
ending 90 days after the date of the placement of the nonimmigrant 
with the other employer, the other employer has displaced or intends 
to displace a United States worker employed by the other 
employer.121 
In other words, an outsourcing firm can indirectly displace a client’s U.S. 
employees if (1) there are no “indicia of an employment relationship” 
between the H-1B nonimmigrant and client,122 or (2) the outsourcing firm 
                                                
U.S. worker who applied and was equally or better qualified for the job than the non-exempt H-1B 
nonimmigrant sought for the job. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(G)(i)(II). DOJ enforces this requirement. 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(5); see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.705 (2016).  
119.  Specifically, an H-1B dependent employer must attest that it “did not displace and will not 
displace a United States worker . . . employed by the employer within the period beginning 90 days 
before and ending 90 days after the date of filing of any visa petition.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(E)(i) 
(2012).  
120.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(n)(1)(F)(i)–(ii).  
121.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(F)(ii). See Cyberworld Enter. Techs., Inc. v. Napolitano, 602 F.3d 
189, 202 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding DOL was required under § 1182(n)(2)(C)(i) to impose a 1 year 
debarment on an H-1B dependent firm because the firm failed to inquire whether the secondary employer 
intended to lay off its U.S. employees).  
122.  “The relationship between the H-1B-nonimmigrant and the other/secondary [employer] 
need not constitute an ‘employment’ relationship (as defined in § 655.715) . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 
655.738(d)(2)(ii) (2016). Relevant indicia of an employment relationship include the following:  
(A) The other/secondary employer has the right to control when, where, and how the nonimmigrant 
performs the job (the presence of this indicia would suggest that the relationship between the 
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asked the U.S. client and has no knowledge that the U.S. client displaced or 
intends to displace its U.S. employees within the covered time period.123  
Apparently Congress considered this mealy-mouthed language still too 
restrictive because the 1998 Act provided exceptions to the non-
displacement requirements. Specifically, H-1B dependent employers are 
not required to make the non-displacement attestation if they submit the 
LCA for “exempt” H-1B workers—defined as specialty workers who are 
paid at least $60,000 annually or hold at least a master’s degree in a specialty 
related to the intended position.124  
The combined result of these cryptic statutory provisions is that 
petitioners are only prohibited from directly or indirectly displacing U.S. 
workers where all four of the following conditions apply: (1) the petitioner’s 
total workforce is made up of over fifteen percent of non-exempt H-1B 
workers, or the petitioner has been found to have committed a willful 
violation within the past 5 years, (2) the H-1B worker lacks a master’s 
degree, (3) the H-1B worker earns less than $60,000, and (4) the U.S. 
worker is displaced within the period beginning ninety days before and 
ending ninety days after the employer files the petition.125  
Officials had warned Congress as early as 1995 that the 1990 Act was 
failing to prevent the unfair displacement of U.S. workers.126 The 1998 Act 
                                                
nonimmigrant and the other/secondary employer approaches the relationship which triggers the 
secondary displacement provision);  
(B) The other/secondary employer furnishes the tools, materials, and equipment;  
(C) The work is performed on the premises of the other/secondary employer (this indicia alone 
would not trigger the secondary displacement provision);  
(D) There is a continuing relationship between the nonimmigrant and the other/secondary employer;  
(E) The other/secondary employer has the right to assign additional projects to the nonimmigrant;  
(F) The other/secondary employer sets the hours of work and the duration of the job;  
(G) The work performed by the nonimmigrant is part of the regular business (including 
governmental, educational, and non-profit operations) of the other/secondary employer;  
(H) The other/secondary employer is itself in business; and  
(I) The other/secondary employer can discharge the nonimmigrant from providing services. Id. 
123.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(F)(ii). 
124.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(3)(B); see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.737(a) (2016); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
Fact Sheet #62Q: What are “Exempt” H-1B Nonimmigrants? (July 2008), https://perma.cc/V2LU-
UB3Y.  
125.  See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2006–2011 35, 
https://perma.cc/PW6S-P7FV (explaining non-H-1B dependent employers may hire an H-1B “even 
when a qualified U.S. worker wants the job, and a U.S. worker can be displaced from the job in favor of 
the foreign worker.”); see also Immigrations Reforms Needed to Protect Skilled American Workers: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 6 (Mar. 17, 2015) (testimony of John M. 
Miano, Washington Alliance of Technology Workers). 
126.  In 1995, then Secretary of Labor Robert Reich warned Congress of the program’s flaws: 
“[W]hat was conceived as a means to meet temporary business needs for unique, highly skilled 
professionals from abroad is, in fact, being used by some employers to bring in relatively large numbers 
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only exacerbated the problem. The futility of the non-displacement 
provisions became apparent during the early 2000s as the tech industry 
shifted towards a “fissured work” model.127 This concept refers to work 
arrangements that resemble the traditional employer-employee relationship, 
but entail the insecurity of temporary work.128 The typical fissured work 
model involves a U.S. client that contracts with a third-party (e.g., an 
outsourcing firm129) to perform functions that the U.S. client previously 
performed itself (e.g., IT), thereby allowing the client to focus on its “core 
competencies”130 (e.g., being “The Most Magical Place On Earth”131), 
cutting labor costs,132 or avoiding legal responsibility for workers the client 
controls (e.g., H-1B nonimmigrants).133  
Today’s tech workplace is the paradigm of fissured work. By relying on 
outsourcing firms to provide an immobile labor force, tech134 and non-
tech135 companies alike can avoid LCA obligations and maximize profits.136 
This trend began in the early 2000s137 and by 2014, the top ten companies 
                                                
of foreign workers who may well be displacing U.S. workers and eroding employers’ commitment to 
the domestic workforce.” Fulmer, supra note 25, at 824–25. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE 
SYSTEM IS BROKEN, supra note 79, at 25 (noting in a 1996 report that the “H-1B program was not 
intended for an employer to establish a business of H-1B aliens to contract out to U.S. employers”).  
127.  See infra note 133. 
128.  Professor David Weil, also the Administrator of the WHD, first coined the term “fissured 
work.” David Weil, Afterword: Learning from A Fissured World—Reflections on International Essays 
Regarding the Fissured Workplace, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 209, 211 (2015). See U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Admin.’s Interpretation, No. 2016-1 (Jan. 20, 2016) (noting the “traditional 
employment relationship” is “less prevalent”). 
129.  “Fissuring is accomplished through a variety of business structures,” such as subcontracting 
and temporary agencies. Weil, supra note 128, at 211. See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 
1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding Microsoft misclassified employees as independent contractors and 
contracted with staffing firms to avoid paying benefits to such employees).  
130.  “[T]hat is, what provides greatest value to their consumers and investors.” Weil, supra note 
128, at 211. 
131.  WALT DISNEY WORLD, https://disneyworld.disney.go.com/destinations/magic-kingdom/. 
132.  See Weil, supra note 128, at 211. 
133.  Essentially, fissuring allows clients to “maintain a sufficient degree of control over 
subordinate organizations such that important . . . standards are achieved, in order to preserve the core 
‘brand’,” while at the same time allowing the client to avoid “direct responsibility, and liability, with 
respect to labor supply.” Timothy J. Bartkiw, 36 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 323, 324–25 (2015) 
(reviewing DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY 
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014)). 
134.  Microsoft, Google, Intel, Amazon, and Apple are not even among the top ten H-1B 
petitioners. See Martin Kaste, Who’s Hiring H-1B Visa Workers? It’s Not Who You Might Think, NPR 
(Apr. 3, 2013). 
135.  For example, “Disney directly employs fewer than ten H-1B workers . . . and has not been 
prominent in visa lobbying.” Preston, supra note 3. 
136.  As WHD has explained, only the “staffing company” that files the LCA is “technically 
accountable.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REFORMS ARE NEEDED, supra note 26, at 52 
(explaining the “contractual relationship” between a U.S. client and the outsourcing firm “does not 
transfer” the firm’s LCA obligations to the client).  
137.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE SYSTEM IS BROKEN, supra note 79, at 3, 25 (a 1996 
report finding six pecent of H-1B workers were contracted out by their LCA employer); Anand 
Giridharadas, Outsourcers Corner Market for U.S. Skilled Worker Visas, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2007), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/8
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receiving H-1B visas—nearly thirty percent of the annual quota—were all 
outsourcing firms.138  
The SCE layoffs exemplify the statutory scheme’s shortcomings in the 
fissured tech workplace. News of the layoffs prompted a group of bipartisan 
U.S. senators, including Senators Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) and Jeff Sessions 
(R-Ala.), to request a DOL investigation into whether U.S. tech workers 
were being unfairly displaced.139 DOL initially declined to investigate, 
citing its limited authority.140 DOL only looked into the matter after the laid 
off U.S. employees complained that as a result of SCE’s contract with 
Indian firms Infosys and Tata, they were forced to train their H-1B 
replacements and ultimately terminated.141  
The U.S. tech workers alleged two LCA violations. First, they claimed 
that being forced to train their H-1B replacements amounted them suffering 
adverse work conditions in violation of the second LCA requirement, which 
according to the relevant statute specifies that a petitioner “will provide 
working conditions for [the H-1B nonimmigrant] that will not adversely 
affect the working conditions of workers similarly employed.”142 Second, 
the U.S. workers also suggested that the firms had committed indirect 
displacement in violation of the non-displacement provisions.143  
                                                
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-visa.4.5257621.html (reporting 
Infosys increased its total number of H-1B employees from 231 in 1998 to 6800 in 2007). 
138.  See, e.g., Ron Hira, Top 10 H-1B Employers Are All IT Offshore Outsourcing Firms, Costing 
U.S. Workers Tens of Thousands of Jobs, ECON. POL’Y INST.: BLOG (Aug. 22, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/259M-FESB (five firms were based in India; four in the United States; and one in 
Ireland); Julia Preston, Large Companies Game H-1B Visa Program, Costing the U.S. Jobs, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/us/large-companies-game-h-1b-visa-program-
leaving-smaller-ones-in-the-cold.html. 
139.  See Letter from Sen. Jeff Sessions et al., to Thomas E. Perez et al., Sec’y of Labor (Apr. 9, 
2015), https://perma.cc/XBX2-54X6; see also Laura D. Francis, Senators Seek Probe into Companies 
Using H-1B Visas to Replace U.S. Workers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 69, at A-6 (Apr. 10, 2015). 
140.  See Letter from M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to Richard J. 
Durbin, U.S. Senate (Apr. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/NF5R-HTQ2 (explaining DOL had not received 
“a complaint from an aggrieved party or a credible source”). 
141.  Patrick Thibodeau, Labor Department Says It Can’t Investigate So Cal Edison’s H-1B Use, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/K298-4G77 [hereinafter Thibodeau, Labor 
Department Says It Can’t Investigate]; Patrick Thibodeau, Labor Dept. Plans H-lB Probe—One That 
Could Have an Impact, COMPUTERWORLD (Jun. 12, 2015), https://perma.cc/RTH9-M2Q5 [hereinafter 
Thibodeau, Labor Dept. Plans H-lB Probe]. 
142.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (emphasis added); 20 C.F.R. § 655.732(a) (2016) 
(defining “working conditions [to] include matters such as hours, shifts, vacation periods, and benefits 
such as seniority-based preferences for training programs and work schedules”). Ontiveros, supra note 
25, at 29. 
143.  See Thibodeau, Labor Department Says It Can’t Investigate, supra note 141. 
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The former SCE workers sought a broad interpretation of the second 
LCA requirement and hoped for a precedential finding that an outsourcing 
firm that displaced a client’s U.S. workers violated this provision.144 DOL 
only responded to the second allegation, however, focusing on whether the 
outsourcing firms were H-1B dependent.145 DOL explained that only the 
petitioning H-1B dependent employers (outsourcing firms),146 not the client 
(SCE), were bound by the non-displacement requirements.147 DOL 
concluded that even though Infosys and Tata were H-1B dependent, they 
had filed the LCAs for exempt H-1B workers and thus, the non-
displacement provisions did not apply.148 This formulaic approach 
conveniently avoided the issue of whether the second LCA requirement—
which prohibits adverse working conditions and for which there is no 
exemption—only protects the petitioner’s U.S. employees or whether it also 
applies to the client’s.149  
3. Why Outsourcing Firms and their U.S. Clients Do Not Satisfy the 
Employer-Employee Relationship Requirement  
DOL likely avoided discussing the scope of the second LCA requirement 
because such an analysis would implicate a serious flaw in the outsourcing 
model—the requirement that visa petitioners maintain a valid employer-
employee relationship with the H-1B nonimmigrant.150 Prior to 2010, there 
was little “guidance clearly defining what constitutes a valid employer-
                                                
144.  See Ontiveros, supra note 25, at 29. 
145.  Id. 
146.  See 20 C.F.R. § 655.715 (2016) (explaining the party “that files a petition . . . is deemed to 
be the employer” of the H-1B worker). 
147.  Letter from M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to Richard J. Durbin, 
U.S. Senate (Apr. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/89GB-URRL. 
148.  Id. 
149.  Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n) (referring to “workers similarly employed”), and LCA, supra 
note 72, with 20 C.F.R. § 655.732(a) (2016) (requiring the petitioning employer to provide the same 
“working conditions to its H-1B . . . employees . . . as it affords to its U.S. worker employees who are 
similarly employed, and without adverse effect upon the working conditions of such U.S. worker 
employees.”) (emphasis added). One commentator correctly observed that DOL “took a narrow, 
textualist approach to the statutory requirements” that focused on whether Infosys was an H-1B 
dependent employer “instead of whether the requirement to not have a ‘negative effect on the work 
conditions of existing employees’ included displacing American workers through outsourcing.”). See 
Ontiveros, supra note 25, at 30.  
150.  An H-1B nonimmigrant is defined as an alien “who is coming temporarily to the United 
States to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation . . . and with respect to whom the Secretary of 
Labor determines . . . that the intending employer has filed” an LCA. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) 
(2012) (emphasis added). The C.F.R. provides that a “United States employer” shall file the petition. 
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(A) (2016). This term is defined in part as an entity that “has an employer-
employee relationship” with the nonimmigrant. See 20 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (2016).  
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employee relationship” for purposes of the H-1B program.151 USCIS 
Associate Director Donald Neufeld clarified matters in a 2010 
memorandum (“Neufeld Memo”), which took aim at outsourcing 
arrangements.152  
The Neufeld Memo explained that USCIS agents would apply the 
traditional common law test in determining whether a petitioner and H-1B 
nonimmigrant maintained a valid employer-employee relationship, 
focusing on whether the petitioner has the right to control, as opposed to 
actual control, over the manner and means of the nonimmigrant’s work.153 
Several factors guide this determination, with no single factor being 
dispositive.154  
Importantly, the Neufeld Memo provided an example of an invalid 
arrangement, in which a petitioning IT outsourcing firm “has contracts with 
numerous outside companies . . . to fulfill specific staffing needs.”155 In the 
scenario, these positions are not detailed in the contract and the petitioner’s 
H-1B worker has been assigned to maintain the client’s payroll. The H-1B 
worker reports to one of the client’s managers and the client determined all 
of the work assignments. “The petitioner does not control how the [H-1B 
worker] will complete daily tasks, and no proprietary information of the 
petitioner is used by the [H-1B] to complete any work assignments.”156 The 
Neufeld Memo reasoned there was a lack of a valid employer-employee 
relationship in such a situation because the IT firm neither had the “right to 
control” nor “actual control” over the nonimmigrant’s work.157  
In the wake of the Neufeld Memo, outsourcing firms haven taken “great 
pains” to ensure their own supervisors oversee H-1B workers at client 
                                                
151.  USCIS Memorandum, Donald Neufeld, Determining Employer-Employee Relationship for 
Adjudication of H-1B Petitions, Including Third-Party Site Placements 2 (Jan. 8, 2010) [hereinafter, 
Neufeld Memo]. 
152.  Immigration attorneys and IT staffing firms unsuccessfully challenged the Neufeld Memo, 
arguing it violated the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment procedures for agency 
rulemaking. See Broadgate Inc. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 730 F. Supp. 2d 240, 247 
(D.D.C. 2010) (holding that the Neufeld Memo did not constitute “final agency action” and thus, was 
not subject to judicial review and the notice and comment requirements under the APA because the 
Neufeld Memo only provided guidance). 
153.  See Neufeld Memo, supra note 151, at 3.  
154.  See Neufeld Memo, supra note 151, at 2 (citing Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 
U.S. 318 (1992) and Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003)). 
155.  See Neufeld Memo, supra note 151, at 6. 
156.  See Neufeld Memo, supra note 151, at 7. 
157.  See Neufeld Memo, supra note 151, at 7. 
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sites.158 In addition, attorneys advise that “contracts should demonstrate that 
contractual performance requires the use of the petitioner’s proprietary 
product and/or knowledge.”159 Many of the top outsourcing firms derive the 
bulk of their revenue from servicing software owned by the client or a third-
party,160 and thus, may struggle to satisfy the property product 
requirement.161 Nevertheless, the knowledge factor is clearly lacking in 
layoffs such as those at Disney and SCE, where the U.S. workers had to 
train the firm’s H-1B workers.162 
II. SEARCHING FOR A REMEDY OUTSIDE THE H-1B STATUTORY SCHEME: 
CIVIL RICO, IRCA’S ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROVISION, TITLE VII, AND 
§ 1981 
The lack of a sufficient remedy under the H-1B statutory scheme 
necessitates an exploration of alternative solutions. Up until recently, the 
majority of “enforcement actions against employers [for immigration-
related offenses] rested squarely with the government.”163 However, recent 
private litigation suggests that tech workers should consider seeking relief 
outside the H-1B visa’s administrative process. 
A. Civil RICO: A Powerful Theory of Liability, Except in the Fissured 
Workplace 
Unlike SCE, the Department of Labor did not rescue Disney from its 
public relations nightmare. So, when two former Disney tech workers filed 
civil RICO claims164 against Disney and the two outsourcing firms HCL and 
                                                
158.  Laura D. Francis, Disney Workers Replaced by Foreign Workers Lose Claims, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA), DLR No. 199, at A-4. 
159.  Larry L. Drumm et al., H-1Bs and Third-Party Worksites: I’ve a Feeling We’re Not in 
Kansas Anymore, AILA IMMIGRATION PRACTICE POINTERS 154, 163 (2010–11), 
https://perma.cc/RG9D-XYH4.  
160.  See Infosys Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (May 18, 2016) (“Our revenues are generated 
principally from services . . . .”). 
161.  See MICHAEL A. HITT ET. AL., STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS AND CASES: 
COMPETITIVENESS AND GLOBALIZATION 97 (2016) (noting “firms such as Wipro and Infosys are 
challenged to develop competencies in terms of their own software niches and to learn how to 
competitively price their new products . . . .”). Even if an outsourcing firm uses its own expertise to 
develop software for a client, the firm will usually lack ownership rights in the product. See Infosys Ltd., 
Annual Report (Form 20-F) (May 18, 2016) (“[O]ur clients usually own the intellectual property in the 
software we develop for them.”). 
162.  Preston, supra note 3 (“Former employees said many immigrants who arrived were younger 
technicians with limited data skills who did not speak English fluently and had to be instructed in the 
basics of the work.”). 
163.  Green et al., supra note 100, at 206.  
164.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2012).  
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Cognizant,165 it marked the first time that American workers sued both their 
U.S. employer and the outsourcing firm.166  
The RICO Act imposes criminal and civil liability for “racketeering 
activity” connected to interstate commerce.167 Section 1964(c) of the RICO 
Act provides a private cause of action for “[a]ny person injured in his 
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.”168 In order to 
state a prima facie civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must establish three 
elements: (1) that the defendant committed “a pattern of racketeering 
activity” (defined as at least two predicate acts)169 (2) that actually and 
proximately caused170 (3) the plaintiff to suffer an injury to his or her 
business or property.171 
There are three important considerations to keep in mind. First, RICO 
predicate acts include violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1546, which prohibits the 
“fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents.”172 Thus, a 
petitioning employer who knowingly makes false LCA attestations would 
violate § 1546 and this violation could potentially constitute a RICO 
predicate act.173 Second, civil RICO plaintiffs can only recover damages for 
an injury to their business or property. Therefore, U.S. workers could not 
recover emotional damages for being forced to train their H-1B 
replacements.174 Significantly, civil RICO plaintiffs can recover treble 
damages and the cost of suit, and thus, civil RICO can provide workers with 
serious negotiating leverage.175 Third, a plaintiff can file a civil RICO claim 
                                                
165.  See, e.g., Julia Preston, Lawsuits Claim Disney Colluded to Replace U.S. Workers with 
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/us/lawsuit-claims-
disney-colluded-to-replace-us-workers-with-immigrants.html?_r=0. 
166.  See id.  
167.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68,  
168.  18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).  
169.  A “‘pattern of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts of racketeering activity” 
committed within ten years of each other. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2012). See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. 
European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2096–97 (2016) (“A predicate offense implicates RICO when it is 
part of a ‘pattern of racketeering activity’—a series of related predicates that together demonstrate the 
existence or threat of continued criminal activity.”). 
170.  See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 508 n.2 (2000). 
171.  Commercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
172.  18 U.S.C. § 1961 (defining “racketeering activity”). 
173.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (2012) (“Whoever knowingly makes . . . any false statement with 
respect to a material fact in any application, affidavit, or other document required by the immigration 
laws . . . .”). 
174.  See Carr, supra note 22, at 418 (“Because plaintiffs cannot recover for emotional and 
physical injuries, victims in minimum wage jobs may not obtain substantial damages.”). 
175.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012). The threat of treble damages led one federal circuit to 
describe civil RICO as “an unusually potent weapon—the litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear 
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even if the government has not prosecuted a criminal RICO case against the 
defendants.176 
In Perrero v. HCL177 and Moore v. Cognizant,178 former Disney workers 
alleged that the outsourcing firms committed a pattern of racketeering 
activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546179 when they “falsely . . . attested 
that there would be no adverse effect to workers similarly situated” (thus 
violating the second LCA requirement) and when the firms falsely attested 
that U.S. workers would not be displaced (thus violating the non-
displacement requirements).180 As a result of these alleged LCA 
misrepresentations, the plaintiffs were terminated and thus suffered 
compensable injuries.181  
In support of the first alleged predicate offense (violation of the second 
LCA requirement), plaintiffs argued that the firms committed visa fraud 
because they “knew,” as a result of their contract to provide Disney with 
hundreds of H-1B workers, Disney “would be adversely affecting the 
working conditions of similarly situated employees by discharging [its] U.S. 
workers” and replacing them with the H-1Bs.182 Defendants countered that 
the second LCA requirement only applied “to workers employed by the 
same employer.”183 The district court agreed, citing 20 C.F.R. § 655.732(a), 
which narrowly construes the statute’s reference to “workers similarly 
employed.”184  
The court then rejected the allegation that the firms committed a second 
predicate offense by falsely attesting to the non-displacement requirements. 
The court determined that the non-displacement provisions did not apply 
because the outsourcing firms had indirectly displaced the plaintiffs with 
exempt H-1B workers.185 Accordingly, the court found that the plaintiffs 
                                                
device.” Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1991). Thus, “promising cases—those 
that survive motions to dismiss—tend to settle before courts reach the merits.” Carr, supra note 22, at 
417. 
176.  Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985). 
177.  Perrero v. HCL Am., Inc., No. 6:16-cv-00112, 2016 WL 5943600 (M.D. Fla. 2016). 
178.  Moore v. Cognizant Tech. Sols., No. 6:16-cv-00113, 2016 WL 5943593 (M.D. Fla. 2016). 
179.  “Whoever knowingly makes . . . any false statement with respect to a material fact in any 
application, affidavit, or other document required by the immigration laws . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1546 
(2012). 
180.  Compl. at 14, Perrero v. HCL Am., Inc., 6:16-cv-00112-GAP-TBS (M.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 
2016). 
181.  Id. at 19. 
182.  Id. at 16.  
183.  See Perrero v. HCL Am., Inc., 2016 WL 5943600, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2016). 
184.  Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n) (2012) (requiring petitioners attest that they would “provide 
working conditions for the nonimmigrants that would not adversely affect the working conditions of 
workers similarly employed”), with 20 C.F.R. § 655.732(a) (2016) (employer attests it will afford 
“working conditions to its H-1B nonimmigrant employees on the same basis . . . as it affords to its U.S. 
worker employees who are similarly employed, and without adverse effect upon the working conditions 
of such U.S. worker employees.”) (emphasis added). 
185.  See Perrero, 2016 WL 5943600, at *4. 
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failed to establish the necessary predicate acts and thus, dismissed their civil 
RICO claims.186  
The Disney civil RICO cases and DOL’s investigation of SCE both 
demonstrate that indirectly displaced U.S. workers will face serious hurdles 
if they are required to prove as part of their prima facie case a violation of 
the second LCA requirement.187 In addition to the problems related to 
fissured work, civil RICO plaintiffs may also face procedural obstacles. For 
example, one federal court held that the INA preempted an H-1B fashion 
model’s civil RICO claim because she did not fully exhaust her 
administrative remedies under the H-1B statutory scheme.188 
B. IRCA Anti-Discrimination Provision: An Administrative Remedy for 
Citizenship Discrimination 
In 1986, concern that undocumented aliens were depriving U.S. workers 
of employment opportunities led Congress to pass the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).189 IRCA’s purpose of deterring 
undocumented immigration by prohibiting their employment was to be 
achieved through new employer sanctions.190 However, Congress believed 
                                                
186.  Moore v. Cognizant Tech. Sols., No. 6:16-cv-00113, 2016 WL 5943593, at *4 (M.D. Fla. 
2016). Like DOL’s analysis of the SCE layoffs, the district court failed to explain why the statutory 
terms “similarly situated,” for purposes of the second LCA requirement, only applied to the petitioner’s 
U.S. employees, and not also the client’s. See supra note 149. 
187.  However, H-1B workers have successfully brought RICO claims against abusive employers. 
See Tanedo v. Placide, 632 F. App’x 896 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming a $4.5 million award to 350 Filipino 
teachers who claimed H-1B recruiters committed TVPA and RICO violations). But see Panwar v. Access 
Therapies, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d 948, 957 (S.D. Ind. 2013); Palmer v. Trump Model Mgmt., LLC, 175 
F. Supp. 3d 103, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
188.  See Palmer, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 109 (holding plaintiff’s civil RICO claim was preempted 
because she did not seek an administrative remedy for allegations that defendants conspired to deprive 
her and other foreign models of a promised salary of $75,000 per year) (quoting Biran v. JPMorgan 
Chase & Co., No. 02 Civ. 5506, 2002 WL 31040345 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). But see Panwar v. Access 
Therapies, Inc., 975 F.Supp.2d 948, 957–58 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (addressing on the merits plaintiff H-1B 
worker’s RICO claims); Access Therapies, Inc. v. Mendoza, 2014 WL 4670888, at *6 (S.D. Ind. 2014) 
(rejecting defendants’ argument that plaintiff H-1B worker was required “to exhaust remedies under the 
INA as a condition to bringing” civil RICO claims). 
189.  Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No- 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). See Natalie Prescott, Immigration Reform Fuels 
Employment Discrimination, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 4 (2006). 
190.  See, e.g., Andrew Strojny, Developments Concerning IRCA's Antidiscrimination 
Provision—What Is It, What Does It Do, and Does It Have Any Applicability To Work-Related 
Nonimmigrant Visa Programs?, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 371, 371 (1996); Prescott, supra note 189, at 4. 
Prior to IRCA, employers were exempt from liability if they knowingly hired an undocumented worker. 
Steven M. Kaplan, The Employer Sanctions Provision of IRCA: Deterrence or Discrimination?, 6 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 545, 546–47 (1992). In response, IRCA made it unlawful “to hire, or to recruit or refer for 
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the threat of liability would cause employers to discriminate against workers 
who “looked or sounded foreign.”191 Congress thus included an anti-
discrimination provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b, which prohibits employers 
from discriminating— 
against any individual (other than an unauthorized alien, . . . ) with 
respect to the hiring, or recruitment or referral for a fee, of the 
individual for employment or the discharging of the individual from 
employment— 
(A) because of such individual’s national origin, or 
(B) in the case of a protected individual . . . , because of such 
individual’s citizenship status.192  
Confusingly, both the IRCA anti-discrimination provision and Title VII 
ban national origin discrimination. But the IRCA is not applicable for most 
U.S. tech workers who are displaced by large outsourcing firms because 
IRCA national origin claims are limited to employers with four to fourteen 
employees.193 As discussed below, U.S. workers should file national origin 
claims under Title VII, which covers employers with fifteen or more 
employees.194 IRCA is unique because it bans citizenship discrimination. 
1. Citizenship Discrimination 
“Citizenship or immigration status discrimination occurs when an 
employer treats individuals differently based on their real or perceived 
citizenship or immigration status with respect to hiring, firing, recruitment, 
or referral for a fee.”195 A prima facie IRCA citizenship discrimination claim 
requires a showing that the plaintiff is (1) a protected individual; (2) who 
suffered an adverse employment action; (3) was qualified for a position; and 
(4) a similarly qualified applicant who was outside the protected class filled 
that position.196  
IRCA’s anti-discrimination provision has several advantages over other 
potential remedies. First, it explicitly bans citizenship discrimination 
                                                
a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a(a)(1) (2012). IRCA also imposed liability on employers for continuing “to employ [an] alien . 
. . knowing the alien is (or has become)” unauthorized. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2).  
191.  See, e.g., In Re Martinez, 1 OCAHO 143 (Mar. 22, 1990); Prescott, supra note 189, at 5. 
192.  8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (2012); see Martinez, 1 OCAHO 143 (Mar. 22, 1990). 
193.  8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2). 
194.  See infra Section II.C.1. 
195.  USCIS, HANDBOOK FOR EMPLOYERS GUIDANCE FOR COMPLETING FORM I-9 35 (2017), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/m-274.pdf. 
196.  See Letter from Seema Nanda to Liane Hicks Cooney, supra note 189. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/8
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against U.S. citizens, unlike Title VII and § 1981.197 Although the anti-
discrimination provision was intended to protect “non-citizens, ethnic 
minorities, or anyone perceived by an employer as looking or sounding 
‘foreign,’”198 U.S. citizens are nevertheless eligible for protection because 
they explicitly qualify as a “protected individual.”199  
Second, unlike the H-1B program’s administrative remedies and civil 
RICO, it is unlikely that U.S. employers can avoid liability under § 1324b 
by relying on outsourcing arrangements.200 In 2015, Bruce Morrison, one of 
the 1990 Act drafters and now a lawyer for The Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE), requested guidance from the DOJ on 
“whether a violation of the anti-discrimination provision . . . can be 
established where an employer replaces a protected employee with a non-
protected contract employee provided by a third party company, rather than 
directly hiring a replacement worker from outside of the protected class.201 
In response, DOJ explained that, barring rare situations, “an employer 
violates the anti-discrimination provision if it terminates workers or hires 
their replacements because of citizenship or immigration status.”202  
However, DOJ went on to explain that “[w]hether an employer has, in 
fact, violated the anti-discrimination provision through its use of contract 
workers will depend upon the facts of each case, including . . . the extent to 
which the original employer could be considered a joint employer of the 
                                                
197.  Bloomekatz, supra note 22, at 1993. 
198.  See Bloomekatz, supra note 22, at 1987 (quoting Lucas Guttentag, Immigration-Related 
Employment Discrimination: IRCA’s Prohibitions, Procedures, and Remedies, 37 FED. B. NEWS & J. 
29, 29 (1990)); see also Shawn Zeller, Technology Workers Target Abuse of H-1B Visas, CQ ROLL 
CALL, 2015 WL 7730439 (reporting that the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers suspect 
DOJ has not enforced § 1324b for the benefit of U.S. tech workers because the provision was intended 
to protect “legal Hispanic workers”). 
199.  8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3) (2012) (defining “protected individual” as a U.S. citizen, U.S. 
national, refugee, asylee, or lawful permanent resident). See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 2 OCAHO 351, 
at 370 (1991) (“Although I agree that native born American citizens were not the primary target of 
protection in the enactment of IRCA, I disagree with the implication that they are not protected.”). In 
addition, the IRCA anti-discrimination provision provides, perhaps counterintuitively, that “it is not an 
unfair immigration-related employment practice to prefer to hire, recruit, or refer an individual who is a 
citizen or national of the United States over . . . an alien if the two individuals are equally qualified.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(4). 
200.  See discussion supra Sections I.C.2–3, II.A.  
201.  Letter from Alberto Ruisanchez, Deputy Special Counsel, Office of Special Counsel for 
Immigration-Related Unfair Emp’t Practices, to Bruce A. Morrison, Chairman, Morrison Public Affairs 
Group (Dec. 22, 2015). 
202.  Id. Thus, IRCA applies “regardless of whether the employer takes the discriminatory 
employment actions itself through direct hiring, or contracts, as a joint employer, with an outside agency 
to implement its discriminatory staffing plan.” Id. 
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contract workers.”203 But DOJ explained that the existence of a joint 
employer relationship is only one relevant factor.204 
On the flip side, there are limitations to the IRCA’s anti-discrimination 
provision. First, it does not offer a private cause of action.205 Similar to filing 
complaints alleging LCA violations, workers who file IRCA citizenship 
discrimination claims must navigate an administrative maze.206 But workers 
have even less time to file an IRCA claim than they do for filing complaints 
alleging LCA violations.207 Workers must also be careful to file their 
citizenship discrimination claims with DOJ’s Immigrant and Employee 
Rights Section (IER), which has administrative jurisdiction over citizenship 
discrimination claims against employers with four or more employees.208 
However, unlike the Department of Labor’s enforcement authority under 
the H-1B statutory scheme, DOJ has the ability to subpoena employers and 
as a result, employers are more likely to cooperate.209  
Second, workers may be disinclined to navigate the administrative 
process because IRCA’s civil monetary penalties are relatively small: for 
first time violations, an employer will be subject to a penalty between $445 
and $3563 for each individual discriminated against; for the second 
violation, $3563 to $8908; and for the third, $5345 to $17,816.210 Thus, 
attorneys will likely only consider cases involving numerous claimants. 
                                                
203.  Id. 
204.  DOJ explained that in addition, it will consider “whether there is evidence of intentional 
discrimination in the selection of employees for discharge or rehire,” and “the circumstances 
surrounding the selection of the third party staffing contractor.” Id. Whether a U.S. client company is a 
joint employer under IRCA is determined according to the traditional common law test. This analysis 
also applies to Title VII defendants. See Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
205.  See, e.g., Biran v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 02 CIV. 5506 (SHS), 2002 WL 31040345, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002) (dismissing U.S. tech worker’s § 1182 and § 1324b complaints and 
reasoning that Congress did not intend “to create a private right of action in” either statute); Shah v. 
Wilco Sys., Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 641, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  
206.  Workers claiming a § 1324b violation must file a charge with DOJ. After an initial 
investigation, DOJ or the worker may file a complaint with an ALJ. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324b(b)–(d) (2012). 
The ALJ will conduct a hearing and either dismiss the complaint or order remedies. 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1324b(e)–(h). The ALJ’s order is appealable to the applicable U.S. Court of Appeals. See generally 
Shah, 126 F. Supp. at 648. 
207.  IRCA discrimination claims must be filed with DOJ within 180 days of the alleged 
discriminatory conduct. 28 C.F.R. § 44.300(b) (2017). In comparison, a complaint alleging a LCA 
violation “must be filed not later than 12 months after the latest date on which the alleged violation(s) 
were committed.” 20 C.F.R. § 655.806 (2017).  
208.  See Malos, Updated, supra note 25, at 296.  
209.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REFORMS ARE NEEDED, supra note 26, at 49. 
210.  U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., CIVIL FINES AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR FORM I-
9 AND IMMIGRATION-RELATED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION VIOLATIONS, https://perma.cc/P25N-
4RGQ. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/8
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Lastly, unlike Title VII, which allows for disparate impact claims,211 
IRCA’s anti-discrimination provision only applies to disparate treatment 
claims (that is, intentional discrimination).212 “This means that to engage in 
unlawful citizenship status discrimination, an employer must have acted 
‘because of’ citizenship or immigration status.”213 However, this does not 
require the plaintiff prove that the employer acted out of hostility or 
animus.214 As a result, U.S. workers have had mixed results in bringing 
IRCA claims.215 The IRCA anti-discrimination provision seems ideal in 
limited situations, such as where employers post job announcements that 
express a clear preference for H-1B workers over U.S. workers216 In 
addition, the IRCA would be ideal in cases such as Shah v. Wilco Systems, 
Inc.217 In Shah, the plaintiffs, an H-1B worker from Britain and a naturalized 
U.S. citizen who was born in India, claimed their former employer stated 
that “Indian workers were needed because ‘Americans don’t make quality 
workers—they’re stupid, they’re too expensive and difficult to control.’”218 
But most cases will lack such clear evidence of intentional discrimination 
and employers may be able to avoid liability by showing that “the 
outsourcing was motivated by legitimate business considerations, such as 
cost cutting, and was not motivated by the citizenship of the displaced 
workers.”219  
                                                
211.  Unlike disparate treatment practices, disparate impact “practices . . . are not intended to 
discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect” on protected individuals. See Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
212.  Bloomekatz, supra note 22, at 1991. 
213.  Letter from Alberto Ruisanchez to Bruce A. Morrison, supra note 201 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 
1324b(a)(1)(B)). 
214.  Letter from Alberto Ruisanchez to Bruce A. Morrison, supra note 201. 
215.  See McDonnell Douglas, 2 OCAHO 351, at 361 (1991) (finding employer unlawfully 
rejected qualified U.S. applicants, instead hiring H-2B workers). But see General Dynamics, 3 OCAHO 
517, at 1170 (1993) (ruling in the employer’s favor, but noting that temporary workers were “basically 
indentured to the company”). 
216.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Justice Department Settles Citizenship Status 
Discrimination Claim Against IBM (Sept. 27, 2013), https://perma.cc/F73J-ACYE. 
 (announcing a settlement with IBM over allegations that IBM “placed online job postings for 
application and software developers that contained citizenship status preferences for . . . H-1B” workers); 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Avant Healthcare Professionals 
LLC to Resolve Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices, (Feb. 8, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/TGY4-3MWH (announcing a settlement involving hundreds of internet-based job 
postings). 
217.  126 F. Supp. 2d 641 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
218.  Id. at 644. 
219.  Tejas Shah & Michael A. Warner, Jr., How Outsourced Workers Could Increase 
Discrimination Risks, LAW360 (Jan. 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/B7L2-RN9D. But see Esther Lander & 
Andrew Turnbull, Defending and Avoiding Citizenship Discrimination Claims When Using Staffing 
Firms with H-1B Visa Holders, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at 3 (Mar. 1, 2016) (“Although it may be 
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In short, workers who decide to file IRCA claims without the aid of legal 
representation must be aware of the risks of filing with the wrong agency 
(e.g., EEOC), claiming the wrong protected class (e.g., national origin 
claims against large employers), or basing their discrimination claim on the 
wrong legal theory (e.g., disparate impact). Indeed, employers have 
generally been successful in “defending discrimination and related claims 
involving H-1B visas” for these very reasons.220 
C. Title VII: A Private Cause of Action for Racial and National Origin 
Discrimination  
As discussed above, displaced tech workers will face various difficulties 
if they seek relief under the H-1B statutory regime,221 civil RICO,222 or the 
IRCA’s anti-discrimination provision.223 Among the remaining remedies, 
workers should especially consider Title VII, which forbids an employer 
with fifteen or more employees from failing or refusing “to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.” 224  
Title VII provides distinct advantages over the aforementioned 
administrative claims and private causes of action. First, Title VII litigants 
can recover more extensive damages compared to the administrative 
remedies for LCA violations and IRCA’s anti-discrimination provision.225 
Second, Title VII arguably “provides more comprehensive protection from 
employment discrimination than [IRCA]” and § 1981, because Title VII 
recognizes disparate impact claims.226 On the other hand, plaintiffs who 
proceed under a disparate impact theory, as opposed to disparate treatment, 
can only seek equitable relief.227 More fundamentally, there is no consensus 
                                                
politically unpopular, there is nothing illegal about companies wishing to outsource jobs to a staffing 
firm to lower overhead costs, as long as they do not purposefully seek to use firms that are staffed with 
H-1B visa holders.”). 
220.  Malos, Updated, supra note 16, at 300. 
221.  See discussion in Section I.C. 
222.  See discussion in Section II.A. 
223.  See discussion in Section II.B. 
224.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2012). 
225.  Before commencing a private civil action, workers must file a charge with the EEOC and 
receive a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l).  
226.  Bloomekatz, supra note 22, at 1994.  
227.  Unlike disparate treatment claims, compensatory and punitive damages are not available 
under the disparate impact theory, only equitable relief may be granted. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1); In re 
Employment Discrimination Litig., 198 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/8
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on the effectiveness of the disparate impact theory in combatting 
discrimination.228 
1. Title VII National Origin Discrimination 
Title VII explicitly prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of 
national origin and race—but not citizenship.229 The Supreme Court 
emphasized this distinction in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., where 
a legal permanent resident from Mexico claimed a company’s policy of not 
hiring aliens violated Title VII.230 The Supreme Court in Espinoza explained 
that national origin specifically “refers to the country where a person was 
born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors 
came.”231 The Espinoza court looked to the plain language of the statute and 
held that Title VII does not apply to citizenship discrimination.232  
Nevertheless, Espinoza may not be a total bar for U.S. workers seeking 
relief under Title VII. The majority in Espinoza acknowledged that “there 
may be many situations where discrimination on the basis of citizenship 
would have the effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin. . . . 
Certainly Tit[le] VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of citizenship 
whenever it has the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of 
national origin.”233 Thus, the disparate impact theory may help U.S. tech 
workers in cases. 
Furthermore, the Court in Espinoza “primarily contemplated an 
immigrant seeking protection based on alien status . . . .”234 Thus, some have 
argued that for “native-born U.S. citizens, citizenship status is inseparable 
from national origin.”235 Justice Douglas reasoned as much in his dissent in 
Espinoza: “Alienage results from one condition only: being born outside the 
                                                
228.  Compare Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
701 (2006), with Charles Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 911 (2005). 
229.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). 
230.  Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973). 
231.  Id. at 88. 
232.  Id. at 95 (“[N]othing in [Title VII] makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of citizenship 
or alienage.”). The federal circuits continue to rely on Espinoza. See Cortezano v. Salin Bank & Trust 
Co., 680 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2012) (Title VII does not apply to “[d]iscrimination based on one’s 
status as an immigrant”). In Cortezano, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged “that Congress took steps to 
limit Espinoza’s holding when it enacted” IRCA’s antidiscrimination provision. Id. 
233.  Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 92 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). 
234.  Bloomekatz, supra note 22, at 1995. 
235.  Bloomekatz, supra note 22, at 1995. 
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United States. Those born within the country are citizens from birth.”236 
Justice Douglas concluded that discrimination against U.S. citizens 
necessarily involves discrimination against all persons born in the United 
States.237 However, this proposition only holds true for citizens at birth, not 
naturalized citizens. Thus, in situations where the employer also employs 
and retains “naturalized citizens, then discrimination against citizenship 
would not overlap with national origin.”238  
This distinction was explored in Shah v. Wilco Systems Inc., in which the 
putative class plaintiffs—a naturalized American citizen (originally born in 
India) and an H-1B coworker who held British citizenship—alleged their 
former employer violated Title VII’s prohibition on national origin 
discrimination.239 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged their former employer 
engaged in a scheme of importing “foreign workers in order to displace 
American workers, trained foreign workers and paid them a salary that was 
‘far below the prevailing wages for their skills in the local United States 
market’ based on their nationality and/or citizenship, and failed to 
adequately train American workers or provide them with needed work 
experience to enhance their skills.”240 In addition, the American plaintiff 
claimed she suffered retaliation for informing H-1B workers of their legal 
protections.241 But because the American plaintiff was of Indian origin, the 
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding that she could only base 
her Title VII “national origin discrimination [claim] as an Indian, rather than 
as an American.”242  
It follows from Espinoza and Shah, that native-born U.S. tech workers 
will only be able to state a Title VII national origin discrimination claim in 
limited situations: that is, where the client “company has not hired any 
naturalized citizens, or does not treat those naturalized citizens the same as 
native-born citizens.”243 
 
 
                                                
236.  Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 96 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
237.  Id. 
238.  Bloomekatz, supra note 22, at 1995. 
239.  Shah v. Wilco Sys., Inc., 2001 WL 1006722, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2001), aff’d, 76 F. 
App’x 383 (2d Cir. 2003). 
240.  Shah v. Wilco Sys., Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 641, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
241.  Shah, a naturalized U.S. tech worker, claimed her employer terminated her “because she was 
an American worker, as an example to the Indian workers . . . and in retaliation for her discussions and 
statements [to the other workers] regarding Wilco’s employment practices.” Id. Shah also alleged she 
was terminated “in reprisal for her efforts to secure her legal rights and as an attempt to intimidate and 
prevent foreign workers from looking into theirs . . . .” Id. 
242.  Shah v. Wilco Sys., Inc., 76 F. App’x 383, 385 (2d Cir. 2003). 
243.  Bloomekatz, supra note 22, at 1995. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] FISSURES IN THE VALLEY  497 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Title VII Racial Discrimination 
However, Espinoza would not pose a hurdle to U.S. workers filing Title 
VII racial discrimination claims. Both Title VII and § 1981 encompass 
discrimination against Caucasian employees (sometimes referred to as 
“reverse discrimination”).244 Following dismissal of their civil RICO suit, 
the Disney workers filed a racial discrimination claim under Title VII and § 
1981.245  
In addition, in two other federal cases, U.S. tech workers are litigating 
Title VII national origin and racial discrimination claims, as well as § 1981 
claims, against two major outsourcing firms (Infosys and Tata).246 In 
Koehler v. Infosys, four  Caucasian employees of American national origin 
filed a class action suit against Infosys alleging it made adverse employment 
decisions on the bases of race and national origin.247 The federal district 
court in Koehler allowed the plaintiffs to go forward in their claims, which 
relied on the disparate treatment248 and disparate impact theories.249  
D. 42 U.S.C. § 1981: A Potentially Effective, yet Untested, Remedy 
Title VII plaintiffs may also pursue relief under section 1981 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981),250 which provides that “[a]ll persons 
                                                
244.  Koehler v. Infosys Techs. Ltd. Inc., 107 F. Supp. 3d 940, 945 (E.D. Wis. 2015) (citing 
Everett v. Cook County, 655 F.3d 723, 729 (7th Cir.2011) (Title VII) and McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287 (1976) (§ 1981)).  
245.  Amended Complaint at 10, Perrero et al. v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc., No. 
6:16-cv-02144-CEM-TBS (M.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2017). Plaintiffs also sought relief under the Older Worker 
Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA) and alleged a hostile work environment based on Disney forcing the 
U.S. workers to train their replacements. Id. at 7, 10. 
246.  Koehler v. Infosys Techs. Ltd. Inc., 107 F. Supp. 3d 940 (E.D. Wis. 2015); Heldt v. Tata 
Consultancy Servs., Ltd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  
247.  Koehler v. Infosys, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 942.  
248.  Plaintiffs alleged Infosys intended to purge Caucasian “employees in favor of South Asian 
employees”—who made up ninety-six percent of Infosys’s workforce. Id. at 943. Plaintiffs also alleged 
that a hiring manager stated: “There does exist an element of discrimination. We are advised to hire 
Indians because they will work off the clock without murmur and they can always be transferred . . . .” 
Id. at 944.  
249.  In support of their disparate impact claims, plaintiffs alleged that Infosys’s hiring of H-1B 
workers “resulted in a significant disparity in the ratio of South Asian employees to Caucasian 
employees . . . .” Id. at 947. Plaintiffs argued that for fifty-three of the fifty-nine U.S. offices, “at least 
94.5% of the employees are ‘Asian.’” Id. at 948. See also Heldt v. Tata Consultancy Servs., Ltd., 132 F. 
Supp. 3d 1185, 1187–88 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (arguing Tata’s discriminatory hiring resulted in a workforce 
“of approximately 95% persons of South Asian descent, race, and/or national origin,” while only 
individuals of South Asian descent only represent “1–2% of the United States population.”). 
250.  See Lee, supra note 22, at 63. 
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within the jurisdiction of the United States . . . have the same right in every 
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white 
citizens.”251 Section 1981 offers several key advantages over all the options 
thus discussed. First, § 1981 lacks any administrative barriers, unlike IRCA 
and Title VII.252 Second, § 1981 “protects against discrimination broadly in 
the right to ‘make and enforce contracts,’” unlike IRCA’s anti-
discrimination provision, which only applies to hiring, discharge, 
recruitment, and referral for a fee.253 Third, there are no statutory caps on 
the amount of compensatory and punitive damages that may be recovered 
under § 1981, unlike Title VII.254  
The biggest drawback to seeking relief under § 1981 is that the case law 
is mixed on whether § 1981 is limited to racial discrimination or whether it 
also covers citizenship discrimination.255 Even if § 1981 applies to 
citizenship discrimination, it is not entirely clear whether § 1981 only 
prohibits state-sponsored citizenship discrimination or whether it also 
applied to private employers.256 If plaintiffs are successful in convincing a 
court that § 1981 applies to private employers that engage in reverse 
citizenship discrimination, then § 1981 would be the best option among all 
the remedies discussed thus far.257 
III. UNIONIZATION, EDUCATION, AND COOPERATION: SEEKING A 
SOLUTION IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION 
While IRCA, Title VII, and § 1981 offer potential avenues of relief for 
indirectly displaced U.S. tech workers, there is little precedent to guide their 
efforts. Furthermore, litigation is not a long-term solution to the problem of 
H-1B visa discrimination. Part III therefore concludes that U.S. tech 
workers should ultimately aim for legislative reform. Workers should seek 
to achieve this goal via three strategies: unionization, education, and 
cooperation with H-1B workers. By relying on these strategies, in 
                                                
251.  42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 286-87 
(1976) (“[O]ur examination of the language and history of § 1981 convinces us that § 1981 is applicable 
to racial discrimination in private employment against white persons.”). 
252.  Bloomekatz, supra note 22, at 2001. 
253.  Bloomekatz, supra note 22, at 2002. 
254.  Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(4), with 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Title VII statutory caps).  
255.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that § 1981 prohibits 
discrimination against aliens); Chacko v. Texas A & M Univ., 960 F. Supp. 1180 (S.D. Tex. 1997), aff’d, 
149 F.3d 1175 (5th Cir. 1998). But see Camara v. Schwan’s Food Mfg., Inc., No. CIV.A. 04-121-JGW, 
2005 WL 1950142, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 15, 2005) (holding that § 1981 does not prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of plaintiff’s asylee status and noting the Sixth Circuit has not yet addressed the issue).  
256.  See, e.g., Duane v. GEICO, 37 F.3d 1036 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that § 1981 prohibits 
private discrimination against aliens). But see Bhandari v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce, 829 F.2d 1343 
(5th Cir. 1987) (holding that § 1981 does not reach private discrimination based on alienage). 
257.  See Bloomekatz, supra note 22, at 2001.  
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conjunction with litigation, U.S. workers can shape public opinion and in 
turn, pressure Congress into reforming the H-1B program.  
A. Unionization: The Role of Virtual Unions in Advocating for Reform  
The LCA’s third attestation contemplates a role for unions. Under 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(B), a petitioning employer must attest that “there is not 
a strike or lockout in the course of a labor dispute in the occupational 
classification at the place of employment.”258 Again, DOL regulations 
interpret the state narrowly, failing to address the realities of the fissured 
tech workplace. The regulations clearly state that “labor disputes for the 
purpose of this section relate only to those disputes involving employees of 
the employer working at the place of employment in the occupational 
classification named in the labor condition application.”259 
Accordingly, a tech union could strike in order to force an employer into 
filing an LCA in good faith or risk being penalized for misrepresentation. 
But this strategy would be ineffective in outsourcing arrangements. 
More problematic is the fact that “unions are hardly present at all” in the 
tech industry.260 Indeed, the former SCE workers were not represented by a 
union.261 Unionization is unlikely in industries marked by “short job 
tenures, heavy use of temporary labor, and heavy use of immigrant 
labor”262—practices associated with Silicon Valley,263 which features a 
“high velocity labor market” in which workers regularly job-hop between 
employers.264 Furthermore, in industries where business lobbies are 
                                                
258.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(B) (2012) (emphasis added); 20 C.F.R. § 655.733 (2016). (“A strike 
or lockout which occurs after the labor condition application is filed by the employer with DOL is 
covered by DHS regulations at 8 CFR 214.2(h)(17).”).  
259.  20 C.F.R. § 655.733(a) (2016) (emphasis added).  
260.  Alan Hyde, Employee Organization in Silicon Valley: Networks, Ethnic Organization, and 
New Unions, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 493, 496 (2002) (“At a high-technology company, the only 
employee who is typically represented by a union is the janitor . . . .”). See Avagliano, supra note 24, at 
676 (observing that the IT sector has traditionally lacked “significant numbers of union members”). 
261.  The laid-off SCE workers were not represented by a union. Thibodeau, Labor Dept. Plans 
H-lB Probe, supra note 141. Following the SCE layoffs, former employees formed the organization 
Save Jobs USA with the purpose of addressing the issue of indirect displacement and has sought to 
curtail expansion of the H-1B program in the courts. See Complaint at 3, Save Jobs USA v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Security, No. 1:15-cv-615, 2015 WL 2242540 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2015) (challenging DHS’s 
rule which grants work authorization to H-1B dependent spouse aliens who possess H-4 visas). 
262.  Hyde, supra note 260, at 498. 
263.  Hyde, supra note 260, at 498. 
264.  See Johanna Shih, Circumventing Discrimination: Gender and Ethnic Strategies in Silicon 
Valley, 20 GENDER & SOC’Y 177, 179 (2006) (noting that Caucasian and Asian females and Asian males 
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influential, like the high-tech sector, there are fewer barriers to migration 
and unions have little influence.265  
Traditional unions have thus had little experience with employers who 
rely on H-1B workers.266 Among the few unions for computer-related 
workers is Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (WashTech), 
which has been described as a “virtual union” because it “advance[s] 
workers’ interests without acting as their legal bargaining representative.”267 
Virtual unions like WashTech face an uphill battle in “trying to persuade 
professionals in what has traditionally been a highly individualistic work 
culture to consider bargaining collectively with employers.”268 However, 
virtual unions and traditional unions do play a crucial role in educating the 
public and Congress on the problems of the H-1B program.269 Without 
unions and professional organizations, the tech industry’s narrative of a 
worker shortage would go unchecked.  
B. Education and Cooperation: Exposing the Corporate Exploitation of 
Tech Workers and Joining with H-1B Workers in Securing Their 
Workplace Rights 
While the 2016 presidential election has shifted the calculus for 
immigration reform,270 the tech industry’s bevy of lobbyists are determined 
to protect the status quo.271 Congress has been all too eager to cater to 
                                                
view job-hopping as a “useful strategy [to] circumvent employers and firms that they viewed as 
discriminatory.”). 
265.  See Giovanni Facchini et al., Do Interest Groups Affect US Immigration Policy?, 85 J. INT’L 
ECON. 114, 120 (2011). 
266.  The one exception seems to be The Society of Professional Engineering Employees in 
Aerospace (SPEEA), IFPTE Local 2001, which represents Boeing engineers. See Dominic Gates, 
Russian Engineers, Once Turned Back, Now Flowing to Boeing Again, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 15, 2012), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/russian-engineers-once-turned-back-now-flowing-to-boeing-
again/ (reporting SPEEA criticized Boeing’s use of Russian contractors brought into the country on B-
1 visas in lieu of H-1B visas). 
267.  Hyde, supra note 260, at 523. 
268.  Andrew Bibby, IT Outsourcing Goes Global, WORLD OF WORK MAG., Mar. 2003, at 15,  
https://perma.cc/B3KR-6VVF. “The problem is tech workers do not like to organize . . . . Unions 
have some branding issues that hold them back from recruiting tech workers.” E-mail from John Miano, 
J.D., representing WashTech, to author (Jan. 21, 2017, 1:18 EST) (on file with author). 
269.  See, e.g., DEP’T FOR PROF’L EMPS., AFLO-CIO, DPE PRESIDENT’S REPORT 8 (June 1, 2015-
May 32, 2016), https://perma.cc/TS6W-2UFW (“DPE continues . . . to educate members of Congress 
and the public about needed high-skilled immigration reforms.”); INT’L FED’N OF PROF’L & TECH. 
ENG’RS, AFL-CIO, Congress Should Reform the H-1B Program, Not Expand It, 
https://perma.cc/GXB9-PFZ6. 
270.  See Roy Maurer, Trump Immigration Policy Likely to Be Enforcement-Heavy, SOC’Y FOR 
HUM. RES. MGMT. (Nov. 14, 2016) (foreseeing stricter worksite enforcement, but arguing that foreign 
workers “should not expect their immigration statuses to be affected anytime soon”); see also Laura D. 
Francis, Will We Really See Immigration Legislation in 2017?, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at S-28 
(Jan. 9, 2017).  
271.  See discussion infra Section III.B.  
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Silicon Valley executives, such as Bill Gates, who has even admitted that 
he is no immigration “expert.”272 Much of the H-1B program’s legislation 
bears the imprimatur of the engineering and computer services industries—
the top spenders on immigration lobbying273 and the top recipients of H-1B 
visas.274 Despite the industry’s lobbying efforts, Congress has not increased 
the visa cap since 2004, perhaps due to the fact that the visa’s “flaws have 
finally been exposed.”275  
H-1B proponents characterize the Disney and SCE layoffs as one-offs, 
arguing “lawmakers shouldn’t overhaul the entire system just because ‘one 
bad apple’ decided to break the law.”276 But the corporate commandeering 
of the H-1B program is not a new practice.277 SCE and Disney were simply 
using the same tactics as other top U.S. companies, such as AT&T,278 
                                                
272.  During his 2008 congressional testimony, Bill Gates, then-chairman of Microsoft, pleaded 
Congress to raise the visa cap. When asked whether there “should there be any limits on H-1B visas and 
. . . limits on [overall] immigration,” Gates answered in part, “I don’t know what it would be like if you 
didn’t have limits, you know. There may need to be limits. I’m not an expert on that.” Competitiveness 
and Innovation on the Committee’s 50th Anniversary with Bill Gates, Chairman of Microsoft: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Science and Technology 42–43, 110th Cong. (Mar. 12, 2008) (testimony of Bill 
Gates). Indeed, Gates and other famous tech entrepreneurs, such as Larry Ellison, Steve Jobs, Steve 
Wozniak, and Mark Zuckerberg, never even attained the level of achievement that apparently qualifies 
H-1B visa holders as the “best and the brightest” (generally, a bachelor’s degree in STEM). See, e.g., 
Norman Matloff, Loss of Another American Dream, (1996), https://perma.cc/SVA4-UD4Z; Daniel 
Costa, STEM Labor Shortages? Microsoft Report Distorts Reality About Computing Occupations, 3 
(ECON. POL’Y INST., Pol’y Mem. #195, Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.epi.org/files/2012/pm195-stem-
labor-shortages-microsoft-report-distorts.pdf. 
273.  See Facchini et al., supra note 265, at 126 (“Barriers to migration are higher in sectors where 
labor unions are more important and lower in those sectors in which business lobbies are more active.”); 
see also Cox & Posner, supra note 43, at 1301. 
274.  John Miano, H-1B Visa Numbers: No Relationship to Economic Need, Center for 
Immigration Studies, 1 (June 2008), https://perma.cc/HRM7-MABU. In 2000, for example, when 
Congress overwhelmingly voted in favor of raising the H-1B visa cap, Senator Bob Bennet (R-Ut.) 
admitted Congress was motivated out of fear of “being accused of being against [the] high tech” industry, 
whom politicians were “tapping . . . for campaign contributions.” Carolyn Lochhead, Bill to Boost Tech 
Visas Sails Through Congress/Clinton Expected to Sign Popular Measure, SFGATE (Oct. 4, 2000), 
https://perma.cc/Y29Y-TJNK. Similarly, Rep. Tom Davis remarked that although it was “not a popular 
bill with the public,” it was “popular with the CEOs.” David Enrich, High-Tech Cheap Labor, THE 
NATION (Sept. 28, 2000), https://www.thenation.com/article/high-tech-cheap-labor/. 
275.  Fulmer, supra note 25, at 859. 
276.  Francis, supra note 158. 
277.  Watt, supra note 8. 
278.  Immigrations Reforms Needed to Protect Skilled American Workers: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 7 (Mar. 17, 2015) (testimony of John M. Miano, J.D., representing 
WashTech), https://perma.cc/PAB7-X8X7. 
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AIG,279 Bank of America,280 Best Buy,281 IBM,282 Sun Microsystems,283 
Pfizer,284 Abbott Laboratories,285 Wal-Mart,286 Harley-Davidson,287 and 
Toys “R” Us.288  
Informing the public of H-1B discrimination is thus crucial to reform 
efforts. The Disney and SCE layoffs illustrate the power of negative 
publicity.289 Just days after the New York Times published an article that 
lambasted Disney, the company reversed an earlier decision to replace 
thirty-five of its U.S. tech workers at their California office.290 In turn, 60 
Minutes investigated the issue of tech worker displacement.291 This was not 
the first time that the iconic news program had shed light on the issue. In 
1993, a 60 Minutes piece lambasted Hewlett-Packard’s use of body shops 
that contracted out H-1B computer programmers for $10 per hour.292 
Hewlett-Packard subsequently “announced that it would take action to 
                                                
279.  Id. 
280.  Id. 
281.  Id. 
282.  William M. Bulkeley, New IBM Jobs Can Mean Fewer Jobs Elsewhere, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 
8, 2004), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107870140865148660. 
283.  Ex-Sun Worker Files Discrimination Suit, CNET (Mar. 19, 2003), http://www.cnet.com 
/news/ex-sun-worker-files-discrimination-suit/. 
284.  See Kevin Fogarty, Did Pfizer Force Its Staff to Train Their H-1B Replacements?, 
EWEEK.COM (Nov. 7, 2008), https://perma.cc/2CDA-3848. 
285.  Ameet Sachdev, Abbott’s IT Layoffs Draw Fire from Sen. Durbin, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 2, 2016), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-abbott-layoffs-durbin-0302-biz-20160301-story.html. 
286.  AFL-CIO, After Decimating U.S. Manufacturing, Wal-Mart Takes Aim at the Information 
Technology Sector (Apr. 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/S5BE-J44G (“Walmart is the only brick and mortar 
retailer that uses H-1B visas to hire a substantial amount of IT workers”); Dave Jamieson, Walmart 
Seeking Foreign Guest Workers to Fill U.S. Tech Jobs, AFL-CIO Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 1, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/01/walmart-h-1b_n_6987200.html. 
287.  Laura Wides-Munoz & Paul Wiseman, Backlash Stirs Against Foreign Worker Visa, USA 
TODAY (July 6, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/07/06/backlash-stirs-in-
us-against-foreign-worker-visas/12266783/. 
288.  Julia Preston, Toys ‘R’ Us Brings Temporary Foreign Workers to U.S. to Move Jobs 
Overseas, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/us/toys-r-us-brings-
temporary-foreign-workers-to-us-to-move-jobs-overseas.html. 
289.  Malos, Updated, supra note 16, at 300 (noting the “risk of negative publicity . . . warrants 
caution” for companies that contemplate replacing their staff with H-1B workers). One reason why the 
Disney layoffs were able to garner national attention was Disney’s failure to adhere to the industry 
practice of using severance agreements that include non-disparagement provisions and waivers. Patrick 
Thibodeau, Laid-off IT Workers Muzzled as H-1B Debate Heats Up, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/2UNA-GVVV.  
290.  See, e.g., Malos, Updated, supra note16, at 300; Preston, supra note 19. 
291.  60 Minutes: You’re Fired (CBS television broadcast Mar. 19, 2017), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/youre-fired/. 
292.  60 Minutes: North of the Border (CBS television broadcast Oct. 3, 1993), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-h-1b-visas-have-been-abused-since-the-beginning/; Ron Hira, 
Bridge to Immigration of Cheap Temporary Labor? The H-1B and L-1 Visa Programs Are a Source of 
Both, 2 (Econ. Pol’y Inst., D.C., EPI BRIEFING PAPER #257, Feb. 17, 2010), https://perma.cc/9K86-
WLB4 (explaining that this wage was “nowhere near what the company would have to pay permanent 
residents”). 
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prevent abuse of the H-1B program.”293 Significantly, the SCE and Disney 
layoffs also prompted a Senate hearing that was highly critical of the 
outsourcing model.294 
These examples demonstrate the value in leveraging the media against 
outsourcing firms and U.S. employers—especially those like Disney who 
are particularly vulnerable in the court of public opinion.295 Such efforts 
may secure reinstatement in some cases, but more importantly, honest news 
coverage is necessary in order to counter the industry’s narrative of a 
domestic shortage in high-tech labor. But U.S. workers should be mindful 
that they will likely be derided as nativists.296 U.S. workers can dispel such 
notions by focusing their efforts not only on American workers, but also 
their foreign counterparts.  
                                                
293.  Matloff, supra note 23, at 821. 
294.  See Beryl Lieff Benderly, Displaced American STEM Workers Spur Senate Hearing, SCI. 
(Mar. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/4C8N-9NUD; see also The Impact of High-Skilled Immigration on U.S. 
Workers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & the Nat’l Interest of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 114th Cong. (Feb. 25, 2016) (testimony of John M. Miano, J.D., representing WashTech). 
295.  For example, Infosys admitted in its SEC filings that it was concerned with the effect of 
media reporting its record $34 million fraud settlement with DOJ:  
[O]ur entry into the Settlement Agreement resulted in significant media attention, particularly 
in the United States. Negative publicity about our company could adversely affect our 
reputation as well as our existing and potential business relationships, which could have a 
material and adverse effect on our results of operations and financial condition. 
Infosys Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Mar. 21, 2015) (also mentioning that in 2007, Infosys entered 
into a $26 million settlement with the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement over claims 
of misclassification of employees). 
296.  See, e.g., Justin Estep, Immigration Hypocrisy and Its Destructive Effect on the Economic 
and Families, 17 THE SCHOLAR 541, 550 (2015) (arguing that lobbying efforts by executives such as 
Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg have been “stymied by unfounded xenophobic fear that citizens are 
losing their jobs to immigrants”); Underwood, supra note 23, at 735 (“The H-1B workers are a prime 
target for anti-immigrant sentiment because they are recruited into a competitive market, employed on 
a temporary basis, and perceived as foreigners.”). 
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Since the late 1990s, when tech lobbying began in earnest,297 the majority 
of H-1Bs have been young298 males299 born in India300 working in computer-
related occupations.301 According to a report conducted by DOL’s Glass 
Ceiling Commission, corporate America tends to stereotype Asian workers 
as industrious, intelligent, polite, non-confrontational, politically passive,302 
and well-suited to “programmed or routine repetitive decisions that are 
learned in advance.”303 Such perceptions have allowed Indians to gain entry 
into the U.S. tech workplace.304 But these stereotypes have also caused 
detrimental working conditions.305 For example, former tech entrepreneur 
and H-1B supporter Vivek Wadhwa explained that the H-1B visa is a 
“flawed visa” because the foreign worker is essentially “held hostage” by 
the sponsoring employer.306 Reports of abusive employer practices surfaced 
as early as 1996, when an OIG audit found nineteen percent of H-1B 
workers “were paid below the wage specified on the LCA.”307  
                                                
297.  See Ron Hira, U.S. Immigration Regulations and India’s Information Technology Industry, 
71 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 837, 841 (2004). 
298.  U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, CHARACTERISTICS 
OF H-1B SPECIALTY OCCUPATION WORKERS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 9 (Feb. 26, 2015) (noting seventy-
two percent of new visas went to nonimmigrants aged between twenty-five and thirty-four years old).  
299.  While the government refuses to track gender data on H-1B applicants, the Anita Borg 
Institute estimates roughly eighty-five percent of H-1B visa holders are male. See Sharon Machlis et al., 
How Many H-1B Workers Are Female? U.S. Won’t Say, COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 1, 2016) 
https://perma.cc/JX99-NB5R; see also Payal Banerjee, Indian Information Technology Workers in the 
United States: The H-1B Visa, Flexible Production, and the Racialization of Labor, 32 CRITICAL SOC. 
425, 426 (Mar. 1, 2006) (noting the “vast majority” of H-1B workers “in IT has been and continues to 
be Indian men”).  
300.  See, e.g., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 298, at 6 (Noting that among all 
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To counter corporate perceptions of H-1B workers as a docile workforce, 
reformers should seek to inform them of their workplace rights308 and join 
H-1Bs as plaintiffs in litigation against abusive employers.309 Through 
unionization, education, and cooperation, reformers can begin to curb 
abusive employment practices without fomenting divisiveness between 
foreign and native workers.  
CONCLUSION 
Much of the scholarship on the H-1B program has focused on how to 
best fix the H-1B statutory scheme. However, recent high profile layoffs 
and lawsuits have highlighted the need for a discussion on whether existing 
federal statutes offer adequate remedies for displaced U.S. tech workers. 
This Note has argued that the fissured work model has not only limited the 
effectiveness of the H-1B program’s administrative remedies, but it has also 
had a spill-over effect into other statutory remedies, such as civil RICO. 
Among the remedies discussed, Title VII and § 1981 seem to hold the most 
promise. But because the case law is still sparse, workers should continue 
to seek legislative reform.310  
Fixing the visa statutory scheme will be no easy task. Immigration is one 
of the most divisive issues in today’s political climate.311 But reform can be 
achieved. Despite partisan divisions, H-1B reform is one of the few issues 
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that unites President Donald Trump,312 Attorney General Jeff Sessions,313 
Senator Richard Durbin (D-Ill.),314 and Senator Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.).315 
Congress should centralize visa oversight in DOL, expand DOL’s 
enforcement authority, and amend the statutory framework in order to 
increase H-1B worker mobility, eliminate the concept of the “exempt” H-
1B worker, and most importantly, extend the LCA requirements to client 
companies that contract with H-1B employers. 
 No wall will solve this problem.316 The culprits are already on this side 
of the border. 
Kenneth M. Geisler II317 
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